PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

—CONCERNING SARTRE’S <ESQUISSE D’UNE THÉORIE DES ÉMOTIONS>—

Masayuki HAKOISHI

Department of Philosophy, University of Iwate, Ueda, Morioka, Japan

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
I. RELATION BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN SARTRE’S <ESQUISSE D’UNE THÉORIE DES ÉMOTIONS>
II. SARTRE’S THEORY OF EMOTIONS
III. PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN THE THOUGHT OF E. HUSSERL
IV. RELATION BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

RÉSUMÉ

INTRODUCTION

There is a certain intimate relation between philosophy and psychology. Psychology has been a discipline of philosophy. And there is only about one century after psychology has become an independent science. Though psychology is at present considered as an independent field of sciences, it is a problem whether psychology is entirely independent from philosophy.

Some philosophers think that the philosophy is the science which grasps systematically recognitions in many kinds of scientific regions. If the philosophy is such a science, not only the relation between philosophy and psychology but also the relation between philosophy and natural sciences become problems.

The relation between philosophy and psychology or the relation between phenomenology and psychology becomes more intimate than before, ever since Edmund Husserl has founded <phenomenology>. Because both of them treat the consciousness, and phenomenology attempts to establish phenomenological psychology. Then Henri Ey, a French psychopathologist, states as the following; it is only once that the word

(1) 今田恵, 『心理学史』, p. i. (岩波, 東京, 1963) [M. Imada, History of Psychology, p. i. (Iwanami, Tokyo, 1963)]
<consciousness> appears in <Annual Review of Psychology> from 1953. But it seems to us that psychology investigates the consciousness through investigations of psychic phenomena (phénomènes psychiques).

It seems that psychology has been influenced by phenomenology. On the one hand, there are some psychologists who insist the importance of phenomenological method. To cite some names of psychologists who investigate under influences of phenomenologies, there are Kurt Koffka, Karl Jaspers as the author of „Allgemeine Psychopathologie“, Ludwig Binswanger, Eugène Minkowski, F. J. J. Buytendijk and R. May etc. On the other hand, there are some phenomenological philosophers who make trials phenomenological descriptions of psychic facts. A representative philosopher of them is Jean-Paul Sartre. He published <Esquisse d'une thèorie des émotions>, <L'imagination> and <L'imagination, psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination> in his early period.

Sartre states his opinion concerning “psychology, phenomenology and phenomenological psychology” in Introduction of <Esquisse d'une thèorie des émotions>, and there he insists that empirical psychology (psychologie empirique) must be founded by phenomenology which is the eidetic science (science eidétique). To this opinion, on the one hand, some psychologists criticize. On the other hand, there are some psychologists who insist the necessity of uniting psychology with phenomenology. For example, F. J. J. Buytendijk writes as the following:

„Das Ende der Neuzeit, in der wir schicksalhaft verfanden sind, aber dennoch in der Verantwortung unserer Freiheit stehen, drängt zur Neugestaltung der Selbst-auffassung des Menschen. Die Psychologie hat dabei eine Sendung zur erfüllen, deren Umfang und Tiefe wir zwar ahnen, aber noch kaum ermessen können.

Sicher ist uns nur, dass diese Sendung verfehlt sein würde, wäre die Psychologie nur blosse Tatsachenwissenschaft. Ihr Beitrag in den Entscheidung der Zeit wird bestimmt durch eine innere Verbindung mit der philosophischen Besinnung. Es war Husserl, der den Grund dieser Verbindung für immer festlegte. Seitdem entfaltete sich die Psychologie als eine Lehre vom menschlichen Sein und eine Lehre der menschlichen Welt und beschwor damit ein neues Klima des Geisteslebens und der Geisteswissenschaften herauf, das vielleicht eine neue Freiheit des Abendlandes verspricht.“

---

In this way, we may say that there are some difficult problems about the relation between phenomenology and psychology. For this reason, we attempt to elucidate these problems. In the following, we will first elucidate the relation between phenomenology and psychology in "Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions". Secondly, Sartre's theory of emotions will be considered. Thirdly, we will take up the relation between fact (Tatsache) and essence (Wesen) in Husserl's phenomenology. And finally, through these investigations the relation between phenomenology and psychology will be considered.

I. RELATION BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN SARTRE'S "ESQUISSE D'UNE THÉORIE DES ÉMOIONS"

Sartre makes a trial to describe emotions phenomenologically in his "Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions". In the Introduction, he argues on the relation between phenomenology and empirical psychology.

And there, he first insists that we have to consider the conception of "experience" (expérience) in psychology. It is for the reason that psychology is, from the first beginning, a discipline which is to be positive and to start investigations from the "experience" only. Indeed psychology at present is not the association psychology, so it is not necessary to hesitate to interrogate or interpret. Although the word "experience" is generally used, there are many kinds of experiences. So we must define the conception of "experience". Sartre writes as the following:

"Le psychologue n'entend utiliser que deux types d'expérience bien définis : celle que nous livre la perception spatio-temporelle des corps organisés, et cette connaissance intuitive de nous-mêmes qu'on nomme expérience réflexive."(5)

Although there are many standpoints of psychologists, they are in accord with the following essential principle; namely, psychological investigations must be started from facts. Then when we ask them "what is the fact?", it seems to us that their answers are extremely vague. Accordingly, if we call anthropology a discipline which aims to define the essence of the man and the human conditions, psychology — even the psychology of man — is not and will not be anthropology.(6) Because, according to Sartre, psychology does not define or limit its objects of investigations a priori.

Therefore, the conception of 'man' in psychology is precisely empirical. So Sartre says, "il y a de par le monde un certain nombre de créatures qui offrent à l'expérience des caractère analogues."(7) This conception of man is insufficient. The reasons are stated as the following. On the one hand, this conception is too wide. For nobody says that the Australian primitive can be ranked to the same psychological class that the American workers in 1939. On the other hand, this conception of man

(6) Ibid., p. 8.
(7) Ibid., p. 8.
is too close. For nobody says that an abyss separates anthropoid apes from human creatures. In this way, the conception of man in psychology is refused by Sartre. And he says as the following:

«C’est dire que l’idée d’homme, si jamais elle prend un sens positif, ne sera qu’une conjecture visant à établir des connexions entre des matériaux disparates et qui ne tirera sa vraisemblable que de sa réussite.»

Psychologists collect recognitions of facts, and nothing more. If psychologists think that they can obtain the total recognition of the human being by collecting recognitions of facts, they are entirely false. According to Sartre, the fact is the isolated (l’isolé). So, to start study from facts means to make positivism nonsense. Because to start study from facts, it is, by definition, to prefer the accident to the essential, the contingent to the necessary, the disorder to the order. For this reason, we cannot eternally reach the essential. As we will show later on, even though one may collect many facts, one cannot reach the essence without use of the eidetic reduction (die eidetische Reduktion).

In psychology, emotions are regarded as irreducible phenomena. For psychologists, it is nonsense to investigate the human condition which enables emotions as human phenomena, or to investigate whether the structure itself of human being enables emotions or not. As psychologists begin their investigations from facts, and emotions are facts, namely emotions as facts already “exist” for them, it is not necessary to consider whether emotions are possible or not. However, when a psychologist investigates emotions, he must always judge whether a psychic phenomenon is an emotion or not. Namely, a psychologist assumes implicitly the idea of emotion. Accordingly, a psychologist is not consistent between his theoretical assumption and his practical investigations. And Sartre indicates that psychologists do lack coherence.

On the foundation of Husserl’s phenomenology, Sartre makes a trial to surpass usual psychologies and psychologism. He says as the following:

«Son fondateur, Husserl, a été frappé d’abord par cette vérité ; il y a incommensurabilité entre les essences et les faits, et celui qui commence son enquête par les faits ne parviendra jamais à retrouver les essences.»

It is impossible to reach the essence by investigations of facts. However, as Sartre indicates, when a psychologist investigates ‘emotion-fact’, he appeals implicitly to the essence of emotion. Empirical sciences (Erfahrungswissenschaften) are often said as the following; empirical sciences do not concern with essence (Wesen) or eidos (Eidos). However, if it is true, investigations of experiences are impossible. Although empirical sciences concern with facts only, they can exist by implicit appeal to essences. Accordingly, what phenomenology orders to us is to make essence explicit.

(8) Ibid., p. 9.
(9) Ibid., p. 12.
and to fix affirmly contents of essences by use of conceptions.

If psychology as empirical science claims to be science of human facts, it first is necessary to define the conception of "human facts". But, in order to define the conception, as Sartre indicates, we have to assume the human reactions for the world as the essential structure, namely the human being and the world. Accordingly, in order to make possible psychology as empirical science, psychology must proceed rather to the preceding than to the psychic, namely it must do to the relation between the human being and the world. This assertion means the following; it has to reach the transcendental and constitutive consciousness as the phenomenological residuum after passing through the phenomenological reduction. In this way, Sartre asserts, on the foundation of Husserl's phenomenology, as the following; it is necessary to take up the pure consciousness as the phenomenological residuum. He states, "c'est cette conscience qu'il faut interroger et ce qui donne du prix à ses réponses c'est qu'elle est précisemment rien." (10) My rapport to my consciousness is precisely the rapport of the absolute proximity. Sartre states it as "la proximité absolue de la conscience par rapport à elle-même." (11) Husserl insists that we must precisely make an appeal to this rapport. But, according to Sartre, psychologists have never appealed to this proximity. This proximity is thought as the evident matter by him. What is the reason? He says, as R. Descartes does, "...... toute conscience existe dans la mesure exacte où elle est conscience d'exister." (12) A phenomenology of emotions will be established by start from the certainty of cogito. And Sartre states as the following; "Il y aura donc, par exemple, une phénoménologie de l'émotion qui, après avoir mis le monde entre parenthèse" étudiera l'émotion comme phénomène transcendental pur et cela, non pas en s'adressant à des émotions particulières, mais en cherchant à atteindre et à élucider l'essence transcendantale de l'émotion comme type organisé de conscience." (13)

In this way, a phenomenology of emotions is possible only when an investigator appeals to the transcendental consciousness, and not when he investigates particular facts.

Sartre tries an analysis of the transcendental consciousness by start from the absolute proximity of the consciousness to itself. Certainly, a self-analysis may be accomplished by the method of introspection in psychology. This analysis is also a kind of reflexional methods. But recognitions by this method cannot be absolutely certain. Because, first, we gain nothing but fact by introspection, secondly, the comprehension (Verst¨andnis)

(10) Ibid., p.13.
(11) Ibid., p.13.
(12) Ibid., p.13. et Voir, R.Descartes, Meditatio II.
(13) Ibid., p.13.
Then, Sartre divides reflexions into the two kinds. The one is the complicated reflexion (la réflexion complice), and the other is the purifiing reflexion (la réflexion purifiante). The former is not phenomenological reflexion. It is the latter that we should use. In the complicated reflexion we are complicated with many kinds of interests, so we cannot obtain certain recognitions by it. On the contrary, the phenomenological or purifiing reflexion gives us the certain recognitions. For this reason, Sartre insists that the purifiing reflexion must be used.

Now, M. Heidegger states that the phenomenon is what it announces itself. I. Kant, as we know well, distinguishes “phenomenon” from “thing in itself” (Ding an sich). But Heidegger refuses this distinction. He writes as the following; „Das Sein des Seiendes kann am wenigsten je so etwas sein, > dahinter < noch etwas steht, > war nicht erscheint <“.(17)

And he insists as the following; to exist for the human existence (Dasein) means to receive the proper being in the existential manner of comprehension. Moreover, according to Sartre's indication, the consciousness exists means appear itself (s'apparaître) in Husserl's phenomenology. So it is for phenomenon that we should ask.

Although a phenomenon of emotion is not that of the human existence, it is the phenomenon in which the totality of the human existence appears itself as phenomenon of emotion. Because the emotion is “la réalité humaine qui s'assume elle-même et se <dirige-émue> vers le monde.”(18) Therefore, a phenomenologist asks about emotion for the consciousness or the human existence.

Thus, Sartre elucidates the reasons of distrust of psychologists for phenomenology. At the first beginning, the main precautions of psychologist consist in the matter that he considers the psychic as fact. As far as a psychologist is so, it is natural that meanings are derived from all the psychic. For this reason, psychology treats the psychic as fact or as fact without any meaning. Moreover, the fact is the isolated or the contingent. In this way, psychology does not aim to grasp the human being in its totality. Even though a psychologist collects a large numbers of the psychic as data, or even though he makes trials to examine them, his investigations cannot be and will never become the psychology of human being.
On the contrary, phenomenologists insist that there exist essentially meanings in human facts. As the human fact is not the isolated matter, the fact without any meaning is never the human fact. So, the mission of a phenomenologist is precisely to investigate the meaning of emotions. Sartre states as the following; "Au contraire, pour le phénoménologue, tout fait humain est par essence significatif. Si vous lui otez la signification vous lui otez sa nature de fait humain. La tâche d'un phénoménologue sera donc d'étudier la signification."(19)

What is the essential meaning of human facts? Sartre says about meaning, "signifier c'est indiquer autre chose ; et l'indiquer de telle sorte qu'en développant la signification on trouvera précisément le signifié."(20) According to Sartre, as a psychologist regards the psychic—for example, emotion, memory, perception etc.—as fact, the psychic is meaningless for a psychologist. On the contrary, if the emotion is the consciousness of emotion, we have to consider that the emotion is meaningful as a phenomenologist shows. We have to make meaning explicit by developing the meaning of act or emotion. Because an emotion is not an isolated or accidental fact. But it is the human existence what appears itself in the manner of emotion. If the human existence must be grasped as the being-in-the-world (l'être dans-le-monde), it is impossible to regard emotion as fact which constitutes the human existence. Accordingly, Sartre insists, "c'est l'homme au contraire qui assume son émotion et par conséquent l'émotion est une forme organisée de l'existence humaine."(21) Thus, he insists the two matter. First, psychology in present is a science of facts. Secondly, if psychology exclaims to be anthropology, it is necessary to found psychology on phenomenology and to find out meaning in the psychic.

It may become clear how Sartre considers the relation between phenomenology and psychology. But it seems that we must note the following sentence which is written in the end of Introduction of "Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions"; "il n'entre pas dans notre intention de tenter ici une étude phénoménologique de l'émotion."(22) According to Sartre, if a phenomenological study of emotions must be sketched, the affectivity as the existential mode of the human existence (l'affectivité du mode existentiel de la réalité humaine) must be the object of the study. But he says that his attempt is to find whether the pure psychology can take out any method and instruction from phenomenology.(23)

As far as psychology investigates "the man in situation" (l'homme en situation), according to Sartre, psychology has to depend upon phenomenology as science of essence. However, since phenomenology is not yet matured and cannot elucidate defini-

---

(19) Sartre, *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* p.16.
(20) Ibid., p.16.
(21) Ibid., p.17.
(22) Ibid., p.17.
(23) Ibid., p.17.
tely some conceptions—for example, the human existence, the world, and the be-
ing-in-the-world etc.—, psychology cannot wait the maturation of phenomenology. Nevertheless, Sartre says as the following; psychology must not lose sight of the two matters, first, the anthropology is possible, and secondly, whenever it may be realized, all the psychological regle must take the sources from it.

Thus, Sartre distinguishes distinctly the region of phenomenology from that of psychology, and he makes psychology depend upon phenomenology. But is this thought valid? For this question, Sartre answers as the following; in order to elucidate whether psychology permits phenomenological investigations in its foundation—for example, whether an emotion is truly meaningful—, we have not any method nothing but go forward “zu den Sachen selbst”.

Sartre says that his attempt is “an experience of phenomenological psychology”. As he says so, we have to take up his theory of emotions.

II. SARTRE’S THEORY OF EMOTIONS

Sartre first indicates the problem of the peripheral theory of emotions (la théorie périphérique des émotions). This theory is also called as James-Lange theory. The assertion of this theory may be summarized as the following; we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble. According to this theory, we must not think as following; we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry, or fearful. And James divides the emotion into the two series; the one is the physiological phenomenon and the other is the psychological phenomenon. He insists that the emotion (state of consciousness) is the consciousness of the physiological representation.

Against the peripheral theory, Sartre states adversely that the emotion is the different phenomenon from the physiological phenomenon, and the emotion is what is more than the physiological phenomenon. Even though the emotion may objectively be the physiological confusion which is a fact of consciousness, it is not any confusion or any chaos. It is rather meaningful and it indicates something else. And Sartre states as the following;

«Et par là, nous n’entendons pas seulement qu’elle [=l’émotion] se donne comme une qualité pure: elle se pose comme une certaine relation de notre être psychique avec le monde; et cette relation — ou plutôt la conscience que nous prenons d’elle— n’est pas un lien chaotique entre le moi et l’univers; c’est une structure organisée et descriptible.»

(24) Ibid., p.19.
(26) Sartre, Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions, p.22.
P. Janet surpassed the theory which regarded the emotion as the physiological. It was accomplished by understanding the emotion as "une conduite moins bien adaptée" or "une conduite de déadaptation". Janet explains the emotion as the following: when one cannot take a superior action which is adapted to it, the psychic energy is used in another manners. To cite an instance, a father tells to his daughter that he may be with paralysis because of ache of arms. Then, she falls down on the ground with a violent emotion. And a few days after, the same matter happens with the same violence. Finally, she must receive medical treatment by a doctor. It is the impatient matter for her to sacrifice her life in order to nurse her father. In this way, in this case, the emotion is the phenomenon of the replacement of "conduite-de-garde malade-ne pouvant-être-tenué". Thus Janet conceived an emotion as "une conduite d'échec", he restored the psychic in emotion. (27)

As Sartre indicates, it is by adopting implicitly the conception of "finalité" that Janet could surpass James. (28) If we use this conception of "finality", we can conceive an emotion as a system organized by meanings which aim a certain final, and not as a physiological confusion. (29) Nevertheless, according to Sartre, Janet concerns with the spontaneous finalism and the mechanism in principle. And in order to surpass this problem and conceive an emotion from a viewpoint of finality, we must take up the relation between a subject and its world. It is the Gestalt Psychology to conceive an emotion in this orientation. According to Sartre, the Guillaume's description of anger, which is founded on Dembo's achievement, shows that he attempts to conceive anger as a modification of world. (30) Therefore, an emotion must be elucidated from the conception of finality. So the consciousness must be taken up. And it is the psychology of psychoanalysis that has first emphasized the meaning of psychic phenomenon.

Here, I will only give an outline of Freud's theory, for I elucidated his theory when I discussed Sartre's criticism on Freud. (31)

According to Sartre, the reason why the psychology of psychoanalysis can draw a line from another psychologies is as the following; the psychology of psychoanalysis insists that all the human act is meaningful, and it uses the conception of finality. To cite an instance, there is a woman who has the phoby of laurels. Seeing a mass of laurels, she is entranced. In this case, a psychoanalyst may indicate a certain incident tied with her sexual incident which has a relation with a mass of laurels. And the emotion such as fear or abstraction is conceived as the phenomenon which is

(28) Ibid., pp.24—25.
(29) Ibid., p.27.
founded on censor. However, according to Sartre, it is not the refusal of laurels themselves, but the refusal of reproduction or recall of the incident tied with laurels. Therefore, in order to conceive the emotion, we must seek the meaning and introduce the conception of finality.

Nevertheless, psychoanalysis contains a great important problem in itself. At the beginning, psychoanalysis has the theory of psychic causality. According to this theory, psychoanalytic therapy elucidates unconscious “psychic trauma”. But the therapy, in fact, attempts to comprehend the internal relation between symbolisation and symbol in facts of consciousness. And it is by this comprehension that psychoanalytic therapy can treat neurotics. Therefore, there exists a contradiction between psychoanalytic theory and practical therapy. In this way, Sartre indicates fault of psychoanalysis and he says as the following; "Nous voilà donc à notre point de départ: une théorie de l’émotion qui affirme le caractère signifiant des faits émotifs doit chercher cette signification dans la conscience elle-même."

On the contrary to the above theories which we have seen, Sartre asserts that the emotion is the magical modification of the world. And the modification is accomplished by complicating with body.

When Sartre considers an emotion, he conceives it as the relation between the human existence and the world. As far as the human existence is defined as the being-in-the-world, it must not be neglected to think the relation between the human existence and the world. Sartre says as the following;

"En un mot, le sujet ému et l’objet émouvant sont unis dans une synthèse indissoluble. L’émotion est une certaine manière d’appréhender le monde."

In short, we live the world in the manner of emotion. When I am conscious of my angry, I am not truly angry. Certainly, I am conscious of my anger. But it is not in the manner of positional consciousness. Sartre insists that the emotion is a manner in which the human existence lives the world. Therefore we must ask him, “what is the proper relation between the human existence and the world?”

Consciousness gives meanings to its world. On the other hand, consciousness lives the very world that it gives meanings. It is said that the consciousness of emotion exists the absurd synthesis of the spontaneity and the passivity of consciousness. Sartre calls this synthesis “magical.” For example, a man attempts to change the manner of world, but he cannot succeed. It is precisely at that time when an emotion is born. Namely, he changes the manner of his being, instead of world. Therefore, consciousness is accomplished with believing (croyance). Sartre says, "l’émotion est subie."
In this way, Sartre attempts to elucidate emotions from the point of view of the being-in-the-world, and he reads meanings in emotions.

**III. PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN THE THOUGHT OF E. HUSSERL**

As we have seen in the above, it is clear that Sartre attempts to make depend psychology upon phenomenology. It is often said that Sartre's theory is mainly under the influence of Husserl's thought of the early period. This matter may become clear when we view Husserl's works which are quoted by Sartre. To take some instances, they are „Logische Untersuchungen,“ „Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I,“ „Zeitbewusstsein,“ and „Cartesianische Meditationen.‘‘ In this point, Sartre is contrasted to M. Merleau-Ponty who is under the influence of Husserl's thought of the later life. In the following, we attempt to consider Husserl's thought in „Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,“ which is often called as the manifestation of phenomenology, and „Ideen I“.

In 1910, Husserl published „Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft“ in „Logos‘‘ in order to establish the transcendental phenomenology of which the idea had already sprouted in „Logische Untersuchungen“. And there he criticized the naturalistic philosophy, the historicism and the Weltanschauungspessimismus. (36)

If the philosophy, from the first beginning, exclaims to be the rigorous science, such assertions that follow scepticism and relativism must be criticized. And the psychologism is regarded as an object of this criticism. Therefore, by taking up Husserl's criticism on psychologism, we consider the relation between phenomenology and psychology. (37)

Hussurl begins to write as the following;

„Seitdem den ersten Anfängen hat die Philosophie den Anspruch erhoben, strenge Wissenschaft zu sein, und zwar die Wissenschaft, die den höchsten theoretischen Bedürfnissen Genüge leiste und ethisch-religiöser Sicht die von reinen Vernunftnormen geregeltes Leben ermögliche.‘‘ (38)

Although the philosophy has this demand, the philosophy, according to Husserl, cannot meet the demand. (39) And he says, „Kant liebte es zu sagen, man könne nicht Philosophie, nur Philosophieren lernen.‘‘ (40) It is considered as a confession of non-scie-

---

(36) We may translate “Weltanschauungspessimismus” into “philosophy of concept of world”.

It is difficult to translate this German word into English.

(37) It is already shown in „Logische Untersuchungen“ that the psychologism is one of sceptical relativisms.


(39) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.289.

(40) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.290. vgl. I. Kant, „Man kann also unter allen Vernunftwissenschaf-

ten (a priori) nur allein Mathematik, niemals aber Philosophie (es sei denn historisch),
sondern, was die Vernunft betrifft, höchstens nur philosophieren lernen.“ (Kritik der rei

nen Vernunft, B. S.865.)
ntificy (Umwissenschaftlichkeit) of philosophy by him. Moreover, Husserl says that the naturalistic philosophy is an assertion which is opposite to the demand of the philosophy. And the psychologism is regarded as a kind of the naturalistic philosophies. Then, the naturalism believes that philosophy must be founded rigorously. But, according to Husserl, not only the theory is fundamentally false, but also the theory gives actually dangers to their culture. For this reason, he insists that it is the pressing need to criticize fundamentally the naturalistic philosophy.\(^{(41)}\)

What is the naturalistic philosophy? It is the thought that is spread with accompany to development of natural sciences. Husserl says;

"Der Naturalismus ist eine Folgeerscheinung der Entdeckung der Natur, der Natur im Sinne einer Einheit des räumlich-zeitlichen Seins nach exakten Naturgesetzen."\(^{(42)}\)

According to his indication, the "nature", for the moment, the spatial-temporeal and physical being. Moreover, the psychic being which changes with accompaniment to the physical being is also seemed as "natural". Because naturalist accepts nothing but the nature (namely, the physical nature). Moreover, things belong to the connections which are united with the physical nature. Therefore, the psychic being changes in dependence upon the physical being. According to Husserl, this conception of nature follows; "Alles Seiende ist psychophysischer Natur, das ist nach festen Gesetzlichkeit eindeutig bestimmt."\(^{(43)}\)

In this way, psychology regards the phenomena of consciousness as the natural phenomena. Namely, every psychological judgement contains the existential position of the psychic nature in it. And on the other hand, the naturalism explains empirically the ideal, since naturalism is convinced that the ideas of sciences is established by natural sciences or philosophy of natural sciences. This naturalistic philosophy follows "the naturalization of the consciousness" (die Naturalisierung des Bewusstsein) and "the naturalization of the ideas" (die Naturalisierung der Ideen). These are, according to Husserl's indication, the characteristics of naturalism.\(^{(44)}\)

Next, Husserl takes up the problem of experimental psychology with respect to "the naturalization of the consciousness". It is generally thought that the exact philosophy, which can be compared with the exact mechanics, is the psycho-physical psychology, especially the experimental psychology. Experimental psychology is, according to what people believe, the exact and scientific psychology which has been sought for a long time and has finally realized a little while ago. And it also said that logic, esthetic, ethics and pedagogics must be scientifically founded by experimental psychology. In short, the exact psychology is, according to the thought which people generally have, the foundation of all Geisteswissenschaften and even of metaphysics.\(^{(45)}\)

\(^{(41)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.293.
\(^{(42)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.294.
\(^{(43)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.294.
\(^{(44)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. SS.294—295.
\(^{(45)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. SS.297—298.
Against the psychologism which has its foundation on experimental psychology, how does Husserl criticize? At the beginning, Husserl indicates that psychology is generally a science of facts (Tatsachenwissenschaft). He insists as the following; as far as psychology is a science of facts, it is not inadequate that psychology founds philosophical disciplines which treat pure principles that determine criterions of all — for example, the pure logic, the pure axiology and Paraktik.\textsuperscript{(46)} For this reason, it is clear that psychologism finally follows sceptical relativism. By probing deeply into this assertion, Husserl determines the psychology as “a natural science of the consciousness”, and psychology is founded on the natural attitude (die natürliche Einstellung). In opposition to the natural science of consciousness, he presents “phenomenology of consciousness” (Phänomenologie des Bewusstsein) which is founded on the phenomenological attitude (die phänomenologische Einstellung).

Husserl says, “Alles Naturwissenschaft ist ihren Ausgangspunkten nach naiv.”\textsuperscript{(47)} The nature, which is the object of investigations of natural sciences, exists simply there. For natural scientists it is self-evident that things exist. And the aim of natural sciences is nothing but the recognition of this self-evident data in such manner that is objectly valid or in such manner that is rigorously scientific. This aim of natural sciences is also that of the psychology which investigates the nature in the sense of the psycho-physical being. As far as the psychic appears in the manner of union with body (the physical), the psychic, from the point of view of psychology, cannot be an independent region which is isolated from the other. According to Husserl, psychology investigates the psychic which exists in the natural connections in the sense of the psycho-physical, and psychology attempts to investigate the psychic in the manner of objective validity. Accordingly, all psychological determination is psycho-physical.

As far as the psychic is put into natural connection, it cannot become a problem to ask the meaning of the psychic itself. If the matter is so, we must say that psychological judgements themselves contain the psycho-physical or the position of natural being. Psychology is a science of facts. Therefore, as Husserl indicates, natural sciences cannot be and become philosophy in any sense.

In opposition to “the natural science of the consciousness”, Husserl shows “phenomenology of the consciousness.” And he insists that we must exclude the position of existent in the natural attitude. As far as psychology does not exclude the position, psychological epistemology cannot but fall into the absurd. Therefore, Husserl writes as the following; “Es wird auch klar, dass wie jede wissenschaftliche, so jede vorwissenschaftliche Ansetzung der Natur in einer Erkenntnistheorie, die ihren einstimmigen Sinn behalten soll, prinzipiell ausgeschaltet bleiben muss und damit alle Aussagen, welche thetische Existenzialsetzungen von Dinglichkeiten mit Raum, Zeit, Kausalität etc. im-

\textsuperscript{(46)} Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.298.
\textsuperscript{(47)} Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.298.
plizieren. Das erstreckt sich offenbar auch alle Existenzsetzungen, welche das Dasein des forschenden Menschen, seiner psychischen Vermögen u. dgl. betreffen.\(^{(48)}\)

Nevertheless, if psychological epistemology attempts to investigate problems concerning the relation between consciousness and existence, the investigations must be directed to scientific recognition of the essence of consciousness. Because the epistemology regards the existent as the correlative of the consciousness or as the thought which is according to the consciousness. Accordingly, the following problems must be elucidated; the first is "what is the consciousness in its essence?", and the second is "what does the consciousness mean?"

Moreover, according to Husserl, there exists another problem. Namely, it is to ask the meaning of the following statement, \(<\text{the object exist, and the object as existent is appeared in recognition}.>\) And he insists that this problem must be evidently elucidated from the consciousness itself. Concerning this problem, Husserl asserts that the study of consciousness in its totality is necessary, for consciousness functionates as the act of recognition in its every form. In this way, he states as the following; \("\text{Sofern aber jedes Bewusstsein } \supset \text{Bewusstsein von } \subset \text{ ist, schliesst das Wesensstudium des Bewusstseins auch dasjenige der Bewusstseinsbedeutung und Bewusstseinsgegenständlichkeit als solcher ein.}"\(^{(49)}\)

As far as all consciousness is "the consciousness of something" (das Bewusstsein von etwas), we must investigate the relation between consciousness and object. And Husserl calls this study phenomenological.\(^{(50)}\) Here, we precisely encounter a phenomenology of the consciousness, which is a science of consciousness. And this science is never psychology.\(^{(51)}\)

Then, how does Husserl think about the relation between phenomenology and psychology? It seems to us that psychology must be clearly distinguished from phenomenology. Because phenomenology investigates the pure consciousness as the phenomenological residuum after passing through the phenomenological reduction. But, according to Husserl, it is not accidental that the relation between phenomenology and psychology accompanies a certain ambiguity. Because, both phenomenology and psychology investigate the consciousness. In this point, both sciences have a thing in common. But phenomenology must be distinguished from psychology. Because phenomenology investigates the consciousness in the different attitude from that of psychology. On the one hand, phenomenology investigates the pure consciousness in the manner of phenomenological attitude. On the other hand, psychology investigates the empirical consciousness, which exists in natural connection, and in the manner of natural attitude.\(^{(52)}\)

\(^{(48)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.300.
\(^{(49)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.301.
\(^{(50)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.302.
\(^{(51)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.302.
\(^{(52)}\) Ibid., Logos Bd.I. S.302.
Nevertheless, Husserl asserts that phenomenology and psychology both are destined to unite in one. He states the reason as the following; „Ist dies richtig, dann würde hervorgehen, dass unbeschadet der Wahrheit, das Psychologie ebensowenig Philosophie ist und sein kann, als die psychische Naturwissenschaft, sie doch der Philosophie——nämlich durch das Medium der Phänomenologie——aus wesentlichen Gründen näher stehen und ihrem Sicksal mit ihr auch aufs innigste verflochten bleiben müsse.“

Then, what is the foundation which enables this assertion? When we attempt to consider this problem, we must first take up Husserl’s thinking concerning the relation between experience (Erfahrung) and essence (Wesen).

Husserl states as the following; „Die Psychologie meinen, alle ihre psychologische Erkenntnis der Erfahrung zu verdanken,......“ What is the meaning of <experience> in the sense of empirical science? This is the first problem. Husserl quotes the following words about <experience> in „Logik“ of Wundt; „zufälliger, nicht erwarteter, nicht absichtlich herbeigeführter Erfahrung“. As far as the experience is defined so, however hard we may investigate the experience, we cannot reach the essence. Secondly, we may note the following matter. The description of naive experimental data, immanent analysis of experimental data and conceptual grasp are accomplished by the conceptions which are kept previously. If the matter is indicated so, we must examine rigorously whether the conceptions are scientifically valid or not. Nevertheless, it may be clear that the conceptions cannot be verified by experimental psychology. However hard we may try experiments, the scientific values of those conceptions does not result from scientific experiments. It is only by the phenomenological analysis of essence that the scientific values of those conceptions are established. Therefore, it is not possible to reach the essence by the analysis of experience.

Psychology cannot take up the psychic as object of intuitive study in the purely phenomenological attitude, since psychology is entirely captive to the natural attitude. But, according to Husserl, intuition of essence (Wesensschaugung) is able to accomplish the study. He says as the following; „Wesensschaugung birgt nicht mehr Swierigkeiten oder>mystische< Geheimnis als Wahrnehmung. Wenn wir uns intuitiv zu voller Klarheit, zu voller Gegebenheit bringen >Farbe <, so ist das Gegebene ein>Wesen<, und wenn wir uns ebenso in reinen Schauung, etwa von Wahrnehmung zu Wahrnehmen blickend, zur Gegebenheit bringen, was>Wahrnehmung<,Wahrnehmung an sich selbst—dieses Identische beliebiger fließender Wahrnehmungssingularitäten—ist, so haben wir das Wesen Wahrnehmung schauendgefasst. Soweit Intuition, anschauliches Bewussthaben reicht, soweit reicht die Möglichkeit entsprechender>Ideation< (wie ich in den Logi-

---

(53) Ibid., Logos Bd.1. S.302.
(54) Ibid., Logos Bd.1. S.306.
In this way, Husserl asserts as the following; as far as the intuition (Intuition) is pure, the intuited essence (das erschaute Wesen) is the adequately intuited and the absoluted datum.

The region which is restrained by the pure intuition contains all region of the psychic phenomenon which is investigated by psychologists. According to Husserl, although the intuition grasps essence as essence-existence, the intuition does not pose any existent (Dasein). Accordingly, the recognition of essence is never the recognition of fact.

For this reason, according to Husserl, the empirical science of the psychic accompanied by the natural connections can first go on as the truly sufficient science when psychology is founded on the systematic phenomenology. He insists as the following; „Nur eine wirklich radikale und systematische Phänomenologie, nicht nebenher und in vereinzelten Reflexionen betrieben, sondern in ausschliesslicher Hingade an die höchst vielfältigen und verwinkelten Probleme des Bewusstseins, und betrieben mit einem völlig freien, durch keine naturalistischen Vorurteile geblendeten Geiste, kann uns Verständnis von >Psychischem<— in der Sphäre des individuellen wie des Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein geben.“ In this way, Husserl asserts that psychology must be founded by phenomenology. As far as psychology is injured by prejudices of naturalism, it cannot represent the psychic in its genuineness to us. For this reason, phenomenology, which has excluded all prejudice or presumption and intuits essence, must found (fundieren) psychology.

In this way, it is impossible to reach essence by investigating facts. If the matter is so, how can we reach the essence? How can we intuit the essence?

According to Husserl, it is by the intuition of essence or the ideation that we can reach the essence. Certainly, his assertion may be true. But when we intuit the essence, what relation does exist between the essence and the individual fact? To this problem, Husserl shows his opinion in his „Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch.“ And there he presents the eidetic reduction (die eidetische Reduktion) which is the reduction from fact to eidos (essence). Accordingly, it seems to us that the relation between fact and essence will be elucidated by considering the eidetic reduction.

In „Ideen I“, Husserl first discusses the essence and the recognition of it. The natural recognition begins from experience and confines itself in experience. The possible region of investigation in the natural attitude is the world (Welt). The science which

---

(56) Ibid., Logos Bd. I. S. 315.
(57) Ibid., Logos Bd. I. S. 315.
(58) Ibid., Logos Bd. I. S. 316.
(59) Ibid., Logos Bd. I. SS. 320—321.
(60) Ibid., Logos Bd. I. S. 321.
investigates the fact in the world is precisely the empirical science. The recognizing act in the empirical science poses the existent as individual. The existent is posed as being in time and space. In this natural attitude, the recognized object is generally the individual. Then Husserl clearly distinguishes fact from essence. He asserts that there are pure sciences of essence (reine Wesenswissenschaften) ——"wie reine Logik, reine Mathematik, reine Zeitlehre, Raumlehre, Bewegungslehre usw." (62) These sciences of essence are pure from >Tatsachensetzungen<. Therefore, they cannot recognize any individual. In this way, according to the distinction between essence and fact, the sciences of facts are distinguished from the sciences of essence. Certainly, the distinction may be true. But how can we recognize the essence?

It may be possible to take out the essence from the conception. It is well known that Anselmus Canterburiensis proved the existence of God from its essence. Do we want to repeat the notorious ontological proof? (63) But Husserl denies this manner of schola in „Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft“.

Then, Husserl states about „Untrennbarkeit von Tatsache und Wesen“. (64) If it is true, an intermediary may be between Wesenswissenschaften and Tatsachenwissenschaften. He often says that the perception gives us evident recognitions. In order to bring perception into being, there must exist the perceiving consciousness and the object which has to be perceived. Then, the object of perception is not the universally general. It is an individual that is grasped empirically. It seems to us that we intuit essence through this individual existent (τοδε -τι). To cite an instance, we draw a triangle on paper, and we prove that the sum of the three interior angles equals two right angles. In this case, we state not only geometrical truth of <this> triangle, but also truth of triangle in general. In fact, when we assert the truth, we prove it not only about one triangle but also about another some triangles. This operation is nothing but what Husserl calls as „die freie Variation" or „Phantasievariation". As far as we want to deny the ontological proof, we must take such the manner that we can approach to the essence through the individual. If one calls the manner as the eidetic reduction, is there any difference between the eidetic reduction and the induction which is used by empirical sciences? In order to answer to this question, it seems that we must consider Husserl's theory of intuition.

Husserl divides intuitions into the two kinds. The one is the adequate intuition and the other is the inadequate intuition. The existent is in general grasped by the inadequate intuition, for the existent or the thing appears one-sidedly to us. When we look around it successively, it appears many-sidedly. But it is never possible that the thing is given in the all-sides at the same time to us. Then, it is a problem whether the

(62) Ibid., § 7.
(63) It goes without saying that the ontological proof is denied by Kant. vgl. 'Transzendent-tale Dialektik' in „Kritik der reinen Vernunft".
(64) E.Husserl, Ideen 1. § 2.
individual intuition is adequate or not. This problem can be turned to the intuition of essence. And the intuition of essence has a character of a giving act (eine gebende Akt).\(^{(65)}\) According to Husserl, this matter means as the following; „Das Wesen (Eidos) ist ein neuartiges Gegenstand. So wie das Gegebene der individuellen oder erfahrenden Anschauung ein individueller Gegenstand, so das Gegebene der Wesensanschauung ein reines Wesen.“\(^{(66)}\) In this way, it is the pure essence what phenomenology aims at.

When we perceive a thing, we must take a point of view to it. As we have seen, it is not the all-sides of the thing but the one-side of it what the projection (Abschattung) gives to us. Therefore, the empirical intuition must be rigorously distinguished from the essential intuition. Nevertheless, Husserl states as the following; „Gewiss liegt es in der Eigenart der Wesensanschauung, dass ein Hauptsstück individueller Anschauung, nämlich ein Erscheinen, ein Sichtigsein von Individueller, ihr zugrunde liegt, obschon freilich keine Erfassung desselben und keinerlei Setzung als Wirklichkeit.“\(^{(67)}\)

So the individual intuition has the free possibility of accomplishment of ideation and of looking to a corresponding individual and to the form of an exemplifying consciousness.\(^{(68)}\) In fact, Husserl writes as the following; „Das Eidos, das reine Wesen, kann sich intuitiv in Erfahrungsgegebenheiten, in solchen der Wahrnehmung, Erinnerung usw., exemplizieren, ebensogut aber auch in blossen Phantasiegegebenheiten. Demgemäss können wir, ein Wesen selbst und originär zu erfassen, von entsprechenden erfahrenden Anschauungen ausgehen, ebensowohl aber auch von nicht-erfahrenden, nicht-daseinerfahrenden, vielmehr „blosse einbildenden“ Anschauungen.“\(^{(69)}\) In this way, Husserl states about “die freie Phantasie”.

When we product space forms of something, melodies and social processes and so on in the free phantasy, or when we fictionize (fingieren) acts of experiences, acts of satisfactions or dissatisfactions, acts of the will and so on, we can originally and moreover adequately many kinds of pure essence through Ideation.\(^{(70)}\) Although what is created by imagination is never the real, it is not necessary to modify the original datum of the essence which corresponds to it.

The position of essence does not contain individual existent of anything at all. In other words, the pure truth of essence does not contain any assertion of facts at all.\(^{(71)}\) There is nothing common between fact and essence, and also between science of fact and science of essence.

---

\(^{(65)}\) Ibid., § 2. S.14.  
\(^{(66)}\) Ibid., § 2. S.14.  
\(^{(67)}\) Ibid., § 3. SS.15—16.  
\(^{(68)}\) Ibid., § 3. S.16.  
\(^{(69)}\) Ibid., § 4. S.16.  
\(^{(70)}\) Ibid., § 4. SS.16—17.  
\(^{(71)}\) Ibid., § 4.
Although the position of individual existent is not contained in the ground of essential intuition, it may be clear that we can intuit essence through the free phantasy about the empirical intuition of individual existent. As far as we admit this assertion, we must also admit that Husserl’s assertion contains a problem. For he asserts that empirical sciences are sciences of facts and they are opposed to phenomenology which is the science of essence.\(^{(72)}\) Psychology is also contained in the empirical sciences.

In *Einleitung* of *Ideen* I, Husserl asserts that psychology is an empirical science and is opposed to phenomenology.\(^{(73)}\) Nevertheless, it seems to us that psychology as an empirical science approaches to essence by investigations of facts. It is generally said that empirical sciences take the induction as its proper method. Isn’t it the essence of fact what empirical sciences aims by the induction?

Husserl states about the induction in *Logische Untersuchungen*. He writes as the following; „Die Induktion begründet aber nicht die Geltung des Gesetzes, sondern nur die mehr oder minder hohe Wahrscheinlichkeit dieser Geltung; einsichtig gerecht- fertigt ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit und nicht das Gesetz“.\(^{(74)}\) It seems to us that this assertion is widely received by many logicians. And Husserl writes moreover as the following; „Und so sind alle Gesetze der exakten Wissenschaften über Tatsachen zwar echte Gesetze, aber, erkenntnistheoretisch betrachtet, nur idealisierende Fiktion — obschon Fiktionen cum fundamento in re.“\(^{(75)}\) Nevertheless, he writes in the same book as the following; „Freilich liegt, wie wir oben erkannt haben, der Statuierung exakten Naturgesetz eine idealisierende Fiktion zugrunde“.\(^{(76)}\)

On the one hand, Husserl asserts that natural laws are only probable. On the other hand, he approves of “eine idealisierende Fiktion”. Considering in this way, we must say, as M. Merleau-Ponty precisely indicates,\(^{(77)}\) that the inductive operations which are used by physicists are the operations by which physicists read essence. Accordingly, we cannot say that the science of essence is the independent and isolated science from the science of facts. Namely, we cannot think the relation between the two as Husserl insists. Although Sartre asserts that eidetic or phenomenological psychology must found empirical psychology, we cannot agree to his assertion. As we have seen in the above, the relation between phenomenology and psychology (and also the relation between the science of essence and the science of fact) is never successive.

Therefore, it does not seem to us that we can reach essence without experiencing any fact. Nevertheless, as we have seen, on the one hand, Husserl asserts in *Philosophie*

\(^{(72)}\) Ibid., Einleitung.
\(^{(73)}\) Ibid., S. 6.
\(^{(74)}\) Id., *Logische Untersuchungen* I. S. 62. (Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1968)
\(^{(75)}\) Ibid., § 23. S. 72.
\(^{(76)}\) Ibid., § 40. S. 140.
als strenge Wissenschaft" that one cannot reach essence without any experience of fact. On the other hand, Husserl asserts in "Ideen I" and "Logische Untersuchungen" that there cannot be any empirical intuition without any intuition of essence. Then, how should we think the relation between phenomenology and psychology?

IV. RELATION BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Finally, in order to consider the relation between phenomenology and psychology, we consider moreover Sartre's theory.

According to what we have seen in the above, it seems to us that Sartre's assertion is self-contradictory. For he asserts that one must start the study of emotions without waiting the establishment or maturation of phenomenology of emotions. There also exists a problem in his "L'imaginaire". Sartre divides this work into four parts. The first part is titled as "le certain", the second "le probable", the third "le rôle de l'image dans la vie psychique", the fourth "la vie imaginaire". Here we concern the first part and the third. As Merleau-Ponty criticizes in his "Les sciences humaines et la phénoménologie", the certain knowledge gained in the first part becomes doubtful in the third part. For example, although he distinguish rigorously perception from image, this distinction becomes doubtful in the other part. To cite an instance, when he states about "l'intention vide" of Husserl, it seems to us that the distinction between perception and image is entirely nonsense. Nevertheless, in Introduction of "Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions", it is clear that Sartre thinks fundamentally phenomenology as the science which must found psychology. Accordingly, it seems that we must consider Conclusion of the same work in order to state finally our opinion.

Sartre asserts in the Conclusion as the following; "Une psychologie phénoménologique qui serait sûre d'elle-même et qui aurait préalablement fait place nette, débuterait de prime abord par fixer dans une réflexion eidétique l'essence du fait psychologique qu'elle interroge.» (80) As phenomenology is not yet established, he asserts so. And he knows the limit of his psychological investigations by phenomenology. According to him, the emotion means "la totalité des rapports de la réalité-humaine au monde". (81) But phenomenology cannot yet elucidate this totality. Then, he asserts as the following; "Les diverses disciplines de la psychologie phénoménologique sont régressives, encore que le terme de leur régression sont pour elles, un pur idéal ; celles de la phénoménologie pure, au contraire, sont progressive.» (82)

(78) Merleau-Ponty thinks that the certain knowledge gained in the first part becomes probable in the second part. But it is in the third part. Voir. Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 34.
(80) Id., Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions, p. 65.
(81) Ibid., p. 66.
(82) Ibid., p. 66
Moreover, according to Sartre, it is valid to use these methods both at the same time. He writes the reason as the following; "La phénoménologie pure suffirait semble-t-il. Mais, si la phénoménologie peut prouver que l'émotion est une réalisation d'essence de la réalité-humaine en tant qu'elle est affection, il lui sera impossible de montrer que la réalité-humaine doive se manifester nécessairement dans de telles émotions. Qu'il y ait telle ou telle émotion et celle-là seulement, cela manifeste sans aucun doute la facticité de l'existence humaine. C'est cette facticité qui rend nécessaire un recours réglé à l'empirie ; c'est elle qui empêchera vraisemblablement que la régression psychologique et la progression phénoménologique se rejoignent jamais."\(^{83}\)

According to Sartre, on the one hand, as the pure phenomenology starts from the consciousness or the human existence that is described and fixed by the a priori intuition of essence, and it is "progressive". On the other hand, the phenomenological psychology starts from preliminary descriptions of individual phenomena as far as phenomena constitute the consciousness or the human existence. And the phenomenological psychology aims ideally at the fixation of the consciousness or the human existence. And it is "regressive".

In this way, on the one hand, Sartre asserts in the Introduction that psychology must be depended upon phenomenology. But, on the other hand, he asserts in the Conclusion that one must use both the progressive method and the regressive method. Then, what does it mean?

According to Merleau-Ponty, we have to criticize such assertion that psychology has to be depended upon phenomenology. Namely, Sartre's assertion is refused by Merleau-Ponty. Now, it may be clear that the matter is not so simple. Because Sartre asserts, as we have seen in the above, that we should use the two methods both. As we have seen, the eidetic intuition (l'intuition édétique) cannot proceed to experience. Sartre does not represents the pure and phenomenological psychology which proceeds to experience. And precisely because of the facticity of the human existence, we must use the method which is united with experience. Phenomenological psychology of Sartre is accomplished by both the progressive method and the regressive method. Accordingly, it does not seem to us that Sartre conceives that the intuition of essence proceeds to empirical cognition. Sartre attempts to read meaning of emotion after he has considered diverse theories of emotions. As the human existence is not God, the human existence cannot recognize the all things from the point of view which is transcendent from the world. The human existence as the being-in-the-world cannot accomplish the intuition of essence without experience, because the human existence is with the facticity.

Accordingly, we cannot simply think that Sartre conceives phenomenology as the science which must found psychology. In this sense, it does not seem to us that Merleau-Ponty's criticism on Sartre is valid. Nevertheless, we must not think that the

\(^{83}\) Ibid., pp.66–67.
relation between phenomenology and psychology is successive. We must think that the relation between the two is complicated. In this sense, we can agree with Merleau-Ponty.

This relation is not only the relation between phenomenology and psychology, but also the relation between phenomenology and empirical science in general. Because of this relation, it is said that phenomenology is "the open method."(84) If phenomenology as philosophy has the "raison d'être" in future, it may be by this relation.

(14 April 1971)

RESUME

Il y a un relation intime entre phénoménologie et psychologie. Depuis que la phénoménologie exerçait influences sur les sciences humaines récemment, il semble que la relation entre les deux devenait intime particulièrement. D'un coté, il y a les psychologues qui usent la méthode phénoménologique. D'autre coté, il y a les phénoménologues qui étudient le psychique. Alors, en cette étude, nous avons considéré la relation de phénoménologie à psychologie.

Premièrement, nous avons considéré la relation de phénoménologie à psychologie dans "Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions" de J.-P. Sartre.

Deuxièmement, nous avons considéré la théorie des émotions chez Sartre.

Troisièmement, en prenant la phénoménologie de E. Husserl, nous avons considéré la relation entre le fait et l'essence.

Et finalement, nous avons considéré la relation de phénoménologie à psychologie par l'entremise des cètes considérations.

Par cètes considérations, il nous semble que nous pouvons dire comme suit:

Sartre, dans Introduction de l'"Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions", insiste que la phénoménologie doit renforcer les fondements de la psychologie. Mais, il ne nous semble pas que l'opinion de Sartre est véritable. Car nous ne pouvons pas atteindre à l'essence sinon de passer l'intuition de l'individu, et il ne peut pas y avoir de l'intuition empirique qui ne concerne pas de l'essence. Il semble que Sartre sait de cela. Car, il insiste, dans Conclusion de l'"Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions", que nous devons user la méthode progressive et la méthode régressive.

Nous devons penser que l'induction des sciences empiriques accomplit une sorte de l'intuition. Donc, la relation de phénoménologie à psychologie n'est pas la relation successive, mais elle est la relation mutuellement complexe. Et c'est de cette relation que la phénoménologie est dite comme la méthode ouverte. Il semble que cette relation assure la raison d'être de la phénoménologie à l'avenir. (fin)

(84) See, 三宅剛一『人間存在論』（勤草書房，東京，1966）[G. Miyake, Ontology of Human existence (Keiso-Shobo, Tokyo, 1966)] and 木田元『現象学』（岩波，東京，1969）[G. Kida, Phenomenology (Iwanami, Tokyo, 1969)