Methodology of Political Psychology & Comparative Political Culture and tacit knowledge

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Abstract

In this essay, I will discuss some epistemological problems of the methodology of political psychology and comparative political culture. If an appropriate cognitive method does not accompany research, our "quality" of understanding of others, or objects of research, will not improve even if the "quantity" of our research increases. To avoid conflicts between individuals and groups caused by distorted or wrong "stereotyped" images, we have to understand each other in the proper way. I will attempt to suggest a solution to the question of the possibility of proper understanding of others in different cultural groups based largely on the argument of tacit knowledge by Michael Polanyi（1983）. I believe that Michael Polanyi's idea of tacit knowledge provides a theoretical foundation for justifying dwelling in the objective cultural context by conducting field work in the objective society. My conclusion is that because we humans, products of a limiting cultural upbringing, cannot avoid looking at things through certain lenses, or perspectives and scopes, ultimately it is impossible to see the truth without some "prejudices". But, we also have the capacity to revise our primitive scopes of recognising others to more reasonable scopes which are recognised by the "object" of analysis as appropriate scopes. Polanyi's argument about tacit knowledge provides a very important suggestion to this problem by supporting the necessity of understanding the inner sense of others.

Introduction

In the opening part of Walter Lippmann's work "*Public Opinion*"（1965）, he examines the gap between the actual and the imagined worlds. Lippmann created the term "stereotype" to describe people's fixed prejudices against others and different cultures. As a solution to the social situation where so many stereotypes exist, Lippmann says that a Socratic doubting "reason" is needed in order to recognise the truth. Lippmann argues that we have to be attentive to ourselves as those who accept, as well as provide, information. The studies of political psychology and comparative political culture were expected to meet the demands discussed in Lippmann's book. Some expected that as the research of political psychology and

comparative political culture progressed, we would be able to see the truth which had previously been distorted by political bias and the limit of people's capacity for appropriate third person understanding. In the last chapter of "*Public Opinion*", Graham Wallas is introduced as a pioneer of a new field of psychological study, about which Lippmann was very optimistic.

This new hope, however, is questionable. It is doubtful whether researchers of political psychology and comparative political culture can contribute to an appropriate understanding of others or, in short, if they succeed if solving the problems of stereotyping. With the emergence of political psychology and comparative political culture, many researchers have analysed the political circumstances of our daily life from a psychological perspective. An important question is whether, thanks to these studies, we can understand others or recognise the politics which mediates our understanding of others any more clearly than we could before. Should we be optimistic about the possibility of understanding others correctly because of the suggestions given by this research? I do not think we should be so optimistic. I think that if we lack an appropriate method of the research, our understanding of others will not be correct. This being the case, is there a correct methodology in the study of political psychology and comparative political culture on the cognitive level and if not, is it still possible to overcome these problems?

In this essay, I will discuss some problems of the methodology of political psychology and comparative political culture. I will attempt to find a solution for them based largely on the argument of tacit knowledge by Michael Polanyi（1983）.

1．Examples of the questions of Political Psychology and Comparative Political Culture and the necessity of knowing the "meaning" behind behaviour

What sort of questions does the study of political psychology address? In my opinion, some of the questions and core ideas of political psychology are simple. For instance, for the purpose of understanding the transformation of man's psychological problems to the arena of political power, some theorists discuss the "powerless" person. They argue that the psychologically powerless person has a tendency to be drawn to some extreme religious movements.

（Alvin）Boderman's hypothesis was, simply that powerless persons who direct aggression inward are more likely to be attracted to extreme religious movements[1]

But, how do the theorists develop this sort of idea to the academic level of social science? We may approach this sort of idea on the relationship between people's abnormal behaviour

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1）William.F.Stone., Political Psychology: A Whig History., Samuel. L. Long（ed.）: The Handbook of Political Behaviour., New York: Prime Press., 1981., Vol.1.（p.32）

and their state of mind quite easily. However, due to the fact that the political psychology is a social science, it requires a persuasive method. Otherwise, people may say whatever they want, for there is no scientific framework to which their theories must comply. "A scientifically oriented political psychology must, of necessity, be concerned with methodology"[2] However, the statements below are related to the question of whether "low self-esteem" will motivate people to political behaviour in the public arena. Although the specific question is different from the one above, the structure of the question seems to be quite similar to that of the "powerless person" A notable aspect of the following question is that a mathematical "formula" appears in the explanation.

> The most general formula which expresses the developmental facts about the fully developed political man reads thus: $p{\mid}d{\mid}r = P$; where p equals private motives; d equals displacement onto a public object; r equals rationalisation in terms of public interest; P equals political man and $\mid$ equals transformed into[3]

As is common in economics, here there is a formula. It is often said that economics, especially microeconomics, possesses an ideal scientific methodology. There are many mathematical formulas in the theories of economics. This is the reason for its reputation as a social science. An appropriate method of scientific analysis is also needed for political psychology. Even so, is it enough to constitute an appropriate method of political psychology as a social science that the theorist relates his ideas concerning a specific social phenomenon and describe it with the use of a mathematical formula? This is doubtful. Even if a theorist's idea is expressed with some mathematical formulas and that style of expression contributes to the clearer understanding of the idea, if the theory lacks persuasiveness in its contents, such a scientific makeover would be meaningless. A theorist as an "external" observer may be able to create his or her theory based on his or her personal observations of social phenomena, but such a theory might be nothing but an naive description of the researchers' personal opinion. In order to acquire persuasiveness, the theory has to be based on an understanding of the meaning of people's behaviour. This is because we are motivated by our senses of values or meanings of the objects of behaviour in our societies.

> To the extent that the social sciences, including political psychology, have imitated the methodologies appropriate to a technical cognitive interest, they have tended to neglect the fact that human action has to be understood with reference to the <u>meanings</u> that the action has for the actors and for its audience.[4]

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2) Morton Deutsche., What is Political Psychology?., Natural Social Science Journal., UNESCO., Vol. XXXV., No2, 1983.（p.232）

3) Harold. D. Laswell., "Psychopathology and Politics", In Harold.D. Lasswell: The Political Writing of H.D. Lasswell. Glencoe, III: 1951.New York., The Free Press.（pp.75-76）

4) Morton Deutsche., What is Political Psychology?., Natural Social Science Journal., UNESCO., Vol. XXXV., No2, 1983.（p.223）

How about the question of comparative political culture? In comparative political culture, there is a problem with "politicisation".

> Why is political socialisation of such enhanced contemporary importance? The reason is simple: Other means of controlling a people have increasingly failed or been declared illegitimate.[5]

This key question of comparative political culture is significant on an academic level. However, for the purpose of understanding politicisation in different cultures, the subculture of the objective culture has to be understood, because each phenomenon of politicisation is sustained by various elements of the subculture. If the analysis of politicisation lacks the understanding of the "context" of politicisation, this analysis may be nothing more than a selfish determination of the objective phenomenon by the theorist, more indicative as to the nature of the culture from which the observation takes place than that of the culture which is supposedly being observed. Besides, the phenomena of politicisation change depending on the variety of people's common understanding of politics in different cultures. Here, there is the same difficulty as with the methodology of political psychology. Therefore, how can people understand the politics around them? What is the meaning of politics for people? The answers to these questions have to be given for the comparative analysis of political cultures. If no answer is given to this question, the understanding of politicisation of comparative political culture will be a self-satisfying pursuit. In this case, the analysis and understanding of politicisation are established only for the benefit of the researchers and not for those objective peoples who are observed.

2．A method of dealing with cultural difference

How can we understand others and other different cultures? People who live in different cultures will inevitably possess other senses of values or different internal senses about the things around them. If so, a theorist as an observer cannot "oppress" his or her individual internal senses which stem from his or her native culture, onto the objective others or objective different cultures. If a theorist does this, his or her observation and theory can not be regarded as an appropriate understanding of the phenomenon, as the theory has been contaminated by the observer's culture.

A. O. Hirschman discusses the cognition of different life styles and behaviours in other cultures in his provocative work, "*Shifting Involvements*" (1985).

In a trenchant critique of Hannah Arendt's advocacy of the public life as man's highest

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5) Richard. M. Merelman., Revitalizing Political Socialization.（p.280）

calling, Benjamin Schwartz argued some years ago that a number of important societies such as the Chinese had long done quite well without any conception at all of the public as distinct from the private good. In such a culture it would simply not occur to the disappointed consumer to turn to public action; a principal alternative that would be open to him instead would be to find satisfaction in the course exactly opposite to the one he has been pursuing- that is, in the decumlation of worldly belongings, in the attempt progressively reduce the intensity of his ambitions, desires, and even sensations. Such is indeed the Buddhist ideal.[6]（Emphasis added by author）

In the above sentences, it is recognisable that Hirschman is knowledgeable of, and respectful towards, Eastern culture where people behave differently. If we take Hirschman's statement about the validity of analysis of different cultures on board, the example of Political Psychology that "private motivation will be justified in the public field" and the formula "p¦d¦r = P" will no longer be applicable to Eastern society. Here another question must be raised. Is the understanding of cultural differences that simple? The difference between cultures is recognised with the use of certain categorisations such as "Buddhist society", "developing society" or "advanced society" etc. Is the awareness of, and respect towards different lifestyles all we need as a predicate to appropriate analysis?

Hirschman's is respectful towards different cultures. His courteous attitude in dealing with others is preferable to the oppression of the observer's fixed sense of values which stems from his or her native culture. Nevertheless, if Hirschman's approach is adopted as a method for analysis, there is a danger that we may oversimplify the actual situation in order to aid easier understanding. For example, in Eastern culture, we may fail to differentiate between Chinese culture and Buddhist culture. Isn't this just another way of oppressing a simplified stereotype on to Eastern culture? Today, even in some Eastern countries, the social situation is changing dynamically in interaction with Western countries and other different cultures. We have to be aware of this dynamic change in the social situation. This raises a new question: How should we deal with such a dynamically changing situation? For instance, in Japan, the social situation is totally different from that of 100 years ago. Even though some people want to cling to the past image of Japan, with stereotypes such as Fuji-yama（Fuji-san in Japan）, Geisha, Samurai, Hara-kiri, et cetera, the actual situation in Japan bares little relation to those nostalgic images（although these cultural relics are often manipulated by the tourism industry）. Instead, today Japan is the land of cutting edge technology and cities of hyper modern buildings. In terms of religious matters, statistically the Japanese majority is, so to speak, "Buddhist". However, many people are "combining" their religions with aspects of another religions such as Shintoism. In Japan, it is not unusual to see people paying their respects to two different gods every morning. Also, there are various distinct Buddhist groups, from traditional large organisations in Kyoto, to dangerous cult groups such as Aum Shinri-Kyou. Is it appropriate to apply the scope of

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6）A. O. Hirschman., Shifting Involvements. Oxford: 1985., Basil Blackwell.（pp.63-64）

"monotheism" for understanding this chaotic cultural situation? It seems that attempting to understand Japanese culture through the fixed scope of "Buddhism" itself is a projection of the Western tradition of monotheism. It is common sense that any social situation is more complicated than that. Now the question is, given these complexities, how can we understand the situation properly?

3．Requirement of logical consistency and "positive" approach as a Social Science

Since we are dealing with the word "science", it is worth noting that the conditions and requirements for a field of study to be called a "science" have long been subject to debate. Some theorists have argued that even though a sense of values is ultimately dependent on each individual, the theory of social science must be neutral and, therefore, universal to all people. Otherwise, social science would lose its validity as a branch of science.

The point of the requirement of logical objectivity of social science is represented in Max Weber's work（1949）.

> It has been and remains true that a systematically correct scientific proof in the social sciences, if it is to achieve its purpose, must be acknowledged as correct even by a Chinese-or-more precisely stated-it must constantly strive to attain this goal, which perhaps may not be completely attainable due to faulty data. Furthermore, the successful logical analysis of the content of an ideal and its ultimate axioms and discovery of the consequences which arise from pursuing it, logically and practically, must also be valid for the Chinese. At the same time, our Chinese can lack a "sense" for our ethical imperative and he can and certainly often will deny the ideal itself and the concrete value-judgements derived from it. Neither of these two latter attitudes can affect the scientific value of the analysis in any way.[7]

What is the significance of Weber's requirement? Weber asserts that we have to be indifferent or immune to our own sense of values, but it is impossible to be absolutely free from ourselves. In spite of our intentions to do so, it may be impossible for us to rise above our deep-rooted preconceptions. According to Weber's requirement, "positivism" is the right method of approach for social science. The stance of positivism is clear. According to positivism, as Karl Popper（2002）argues, we can argue anything as long as the theory or hypothesis retains logical consistency and "falsifiability". Nevertheless, the question still remains as to whether this is enough to achieve the aim of social science. For Weber, the aim of social science is to "understand" society. Is that a reasonable requirement for the analysis of social science? Of course, the openness of the argument to refutation is important, because the study must not be a "religion" or some kind of Marxist doctrine requiring absolute belief. But if the study of

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7）Max Weber., The Methodology of Social Science. 1949: New York., The Free Press.（p. 59）

social science lacks the understanding of the internal meanings of the subjects of behaviour, this "falsifiable" research will lead to a superficial understanding of others. Positivism does not necessarily require the understanding of the internal senses of others and other different societies in its methodology.

Let me give an example. The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama published a book, "*The End of the History and The Last Man*" (1983). Due to the boldness of this title and the nature of the theory, this argument was given a lot of mass media attention. Actually, the logic of his argument was quite simple and, in my opinion, it seemed to adapt to the methodological requirement of "positivism". Fukuyama argued that "History" consists of man's conflicts for recognition. According to Fukuyama, the ultimate power of propelling these human conflicts is man's "spirit". Today, the political regime of democracy has spread to over almost all over the world. In this system of democracy, people can express their opinions thanks to the tenet of equal citizenship, by which all men are recognised as equal. Fukuyama said that this marks the end of the History of man. Fukuyama's definitions of democracy and History were quite clear and his logic was simple. Fukuyama's argument seemed to be falsifiable with reference to data gathered from countries where democracy was not adopted as a national regime, or by showing conflicts or wars which still occur in some places.

However, the question remains as to whether such a positivist approach is appropriate for understanding the situation of society. If Fukuyama's thesis was recognised in academic circles as a proper positivist argument, so what? "What is the significance of the argument for the aim of social science?" Even if an argument of social science is logically consistent, and it is significant in a particular academic circle, does it necessarily have any significance for others? Is it a proper way of understanding society? Actually, the style of acceptance of a political regime such as democracy depends on each country and culture. It seems that Fukuyama's argument was nothing but an oppression of his native culture's (American) understanding of the concept of democracy without understanding the possibility of different interpretations. Even if a hypothesis or analysis retains its logical plausibility, the argument may still lack significance in terms of the aim of social science.

Game theory is another example of a positivist approach. game theory is not an empirical study, but a deductive approach to understanding people's behaviour. This approach conforms to Weber's requirement. The logic of rational behaviour in game theory is logically consistent and plausible. But the hypothetical assumption of the "prisoner's dilemma" and some logical results of that assumption such as "Nash equilibrium" are based on the purely hypothetical assumption that man is an isolated and wanton egoist. However, some results of the actual experiments of game theory show that people do not behave as game theory expects. For instance, under the circumstances of the hypothetical prison dilemma, the players of the game decrease their own profit with their egoistic behaviour and drive for individual profit. Actually, this is an expected result of game theory which is based on the hypothesis of egoistic individuals. However, actual experiments of show that even if those players play under the

same circumstances several times, those players do not learn from their mistakes. This empirical result is against the hypothetical "equilibrium" of the prisoner dilemma as a result of the dynamic movement which is caused by learning.

What does this imply? That the vision of man which theorists assume as the basis of their theory may be different from the truth. Game theory supposes that the players of the game are egoistic. Then, players are supposed to be able to predict the actions of the other players. As a third party, we may not find any problem or insufficiency in this supposition. But one of the most important elements necessary for those players of the game is the "vision" or "image" of others（other players）. In the game, if a player "imagines" another player as a totally wanton egoistic being, that player might take plausible action which is expected by game theory's logic. But, if a player does not regard another player as such, the result of game will be different from the expectation of game theory. It seems that the result of a game depends on the player's "imagination" or "view" of the other players. If a player does not view the others as wanton egoists, that player's behaviour will be change accordingly. If one's image of others is adapted to the supposition of game theory and others also take the same view, the result of the game may accord to the expectation of game theory, even though the result of game depends on each player's ability to "read" other players' behaviour. If this is not the case, the outcomes of the games will not be in line with the expectation of the game theory.

4. Sympathy and commitment: A requirement of knowing different commitments

Game theory cannot predict the results of the game because the players' views of each other are different from the assumption of the theory. Amartya Sen（1982）introduces a distinction between "sympathy" and "commitment" as a principle of human behaviour, for the purpose of revising the traditional framework of economics theory.

> As we consider departure from "unsympathetic isolation abstractly assumed in Economics", to use Edgeworth's words, we must distinguish between two separate concepts:（i）sympathy and（ii）commitment. The former corresponds to the case in which the concern for other directly affects one's welfare. If the knowledge of torture of other makes you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if its does not make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment.[8]

Traditional economics theory has been based on the view of man as an isolated, egoistic being. However, many outcomes of economic theory seem to be beyond our "common sense" and the theories cannot explain our behaviour convincingly. Let me take the "paradox of vote" as an example. The homo-economics view of voting behaviour is problematic. If people really

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8）Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: Choice, Welfare and Measurement., Basil Blackwell., 1982.（pp.91-92）

are "egoistic", then why do they vote in elections, knowing the unlikeness of their individual vote having any significant effect on the outcome? Within the Homo-economics assumption of man as an egoistic, the rationality of a voter's behaviour can not be explained. However, if we do not take these assumptions on board, we may explain voting behaviour. As Sen explains, the voter's motivation may simply be that he wanted to express his preference. There are other possible explanations of voting behaviour. In some countries, where participating in an election is thought of as a crucial duty of all citizens, it is natural that people will vote, because otherwise they would be reproached by others for not fulfilling this duty. If we follow our common sense, this sort of psychological rationality of behaviour is natural. We have various senses of values and social norms depending on each person and society. It conforms better to our common sense to think that the rationale of one's behaviour depends on those elements, rather than the monotonous simple reasons supposed by economics. But what are the more specific meanings of the concepts of "sympathy" and "commitment"? Sen gives an interesting explanation.

> The contrast between sympathy and commitment may be illustrated with the story of two boys who find two apples, on large, one small. Boy A tells boy B, "you choose". B immediately pitches the larger apple. A is upset and permit himself the remarks that this way grossly unfair. "Why?" asks B. "Which one would you have chosen, if you were to choose rather than me?" "The smaller one, of course", A replies. B is now triumphant: "Then what are you complaining about?" That's the one you've got! B certainly wins this round of the argument, but in fact A would have lost nothing from B's choice had his own hypothetical choice of the smaller apple been based on sympathy as opposed to commitment. A's anger indicates that this was probably not the case[9]

It seems that one's sympathetic behaviour is based on an expectation that the other person will make a certain choice. In this case, the choice seems to be motivated by selfishness. But the most important factor which characterises "sympathy" is that the person who is behaving "sympathetically" is embodied with "sympathetic emotion". When it is said that one is behaving "sympathetically", the subject is not aware of the inner transcendent criteria which judges if the behaviour is "good" or not. On the other hand, when one's behaviour is based on "commitment", it is based on awareness of one's own thought. The behaviour is not entirely based on the cognition of the behaviour of others. Since we have the capacity to reflect ourselves or objectify ourselves, even though we share some basic emotions with others and we are aware of this, we do not necessarily need to rely on our "sympathy" with others all the time. One can behave following his or her own ethical norms. That said, is this criteria of behaviour an entirely personal thing, detached from one's socially possessed sense of values?

Commitment is, of course, closely connected with <u>one's</u> morals. But moral this question is

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9) Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: Choice, Welfare and Measurement., Basil Blackwell., 1982.（p.93）

in a very broad sense, covering a variety of influences from religious to political, from the ill-understood to the well argued"[10]

Commitment may be based on personally chosen morals, but to some extent it must also be based on internalised cultural norms or the values of one's society. In our lives, our individual morality is formed within a society based on the meanings and morals of that society. In this sense, the moral or social sanctions in a society must be deeply concerned with "one's" individual morality, even though one has the capacity to be autonomous and to adapt to another culture's moral or social norms by one's own volition. Generally, people are not entirely "altruistic". People's behaviour which is based on "commitment" is generally mediated by the commonly possessed norms of the society. Our personal sense of values is mediated by society. It is impossible to detach those things completely. Moreover, as a common sense, there are varieties of norms or senses of values depending on each society. Hence, the background of one's determination of, at least, the basic aspects or behaviour depends on the cultural group to which one belongs. So, in order to understand people's behaviour correctly, we need to know the commonly possessed senses of values of the society.

In the methodology of political psychology, "empathy" is required as a tool to analyse the political situation and the people within it. The concept of empathy seems to be parallel to Sen's concept of commitment. The establishment of these concepts deepens our study of behaviour to the cognitive level. Neither commitment nor empathy is "value free" concepts. They certainly contain some sense of values and meanings which are intended by the cognition of some specific commitment or empathy of the subject. Then, they must depend on each different norm or sanction of society. In this sense, commitment and empathy can not be recognised as value free conceptions. Even in the "cognitive" level, a certain sense of values is based on the commonly possessed meanings of each society. If so, the problem which we need to address is what the specific contents and meanings of the specific commitment or empathy are. Also, we have to ask how the different contents or meanings of a specific commitment and empathy are understood or treated by political psychology and comparative political culture.

5．An importance of my question and a necessity of its solution

People, including researchers, tend to believe that social phenomena are "static" or "fixed". From this primitive image or theorem, it has been concluded that, if some research isolates the bad aspects of society and "removes" it, the society will become good. This way of thinking is at the root of the methodology of social science. But, this is absolutely wrong. Social phenomena are created and produced by living people who are capable of being conscious of

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10）*Ibid.*（p.93）

themselves. People accept some ideas or imaginations and those people will create new situations dynamically according to those ideas or imaginations. In this sense, our society seems to be "self-creating" and organic, because the subjects who create the social phenomena are we humans, as the only beings who have the capacity for such creation In sociology, it has been argued that "wrongly conceived images" which are projected on to others will eventually create the imagined situation in reality. Let me give an example. If a group of people are thought of as "bad", and the majority of the society believes that they are thieves, even if that minority is innocent and those conceived images are wrong initially, due to the fact that such a negative image is accepted by the majority, that majority would not employ that minority, or would not give them good places to live. As a result, those minorities will lose their opportunity for promotion in social status and, eventually, the wrong image will be "realised" in that society. This hypothesis asserts that the "wrong image" conceived in people's minds may eventually be realised. The same will be true of falsely conceived good images. In human society, bad or good or images can materialise themselves in reality.

However, how is the relationship between the projected images of others and reality concerned with our "internal" state of mind? How about the state of mind of the people on to whom those distorted images has been projected? Charles Taylor（1994）discusses that many political conflicts have been caused by such misconceptions of minorities.

The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. Thus some feminists have argued that women in patriarchal societies have been induced to adopt a depreciatory image of themselves. They have internalised a picture of their own inferiority, so that even when some of the objective obstacles to their advancement fall away, they may be incapable of taking advantage of the new opportunities. And beyond this, they are condemned to suffer the pain of low self-esteem. An analogous point has been made in relation to blacks: that white society has for generations projected a demeaning image of them, which some of them have been unable to resist adopting. Their own self-depreciation, on this view, becomes one of the most potent instruments of their own oppression."[11]

Taylor believes, rather optimistically, that publishing and revealing these facts may change the actual situation, which is mediated by people's consciousness. This is not only true of our daily life, but also adapted on the academic level. Sometimes, stereotype prejudices are applied

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11）Charles Taylor., Politics for Recognition., Amy Gutmann（ed.）Multiculturalism.1994: Princeton., Princeton University Press.（pp. 25-26）

to some people and cultures by academic researches. For instance, Ruth Benedict's study of Japanese culture（1989）as the culture of "sin" and "shame" is still given credence by people as a scope for understanding Japanese culture, even though for the Japanese（who are the very object of that theory）, it is hard to accept. This structure relates to many other fields of social studies. In politics, some students and researchers attempt to recognise people as "power seekers", and their daily life as "politics". Though some women in the feminist movement must have been suffered from distorted or wrong images of them held by male dominated societies, their own image of males as persecutioners may create hostility among those males towards the women in the society.

A common structure of these dangers seems to be adapted to the studies of political psychology and comparative political culture as the domains of social science. If those researchers or students conceive the wrong hypothesis derived from distorted stereotype images of others, the same situation as above will occur. Is important to address the question of how political psychology or comparative political culture can avoid this pitfall? In other words, how can we analyse others and other cultures in an appropriate way, whilst retaining academic value in our studies?

６．The necessity of understanding the inner sense of others, and Michael Polanyi's argument of Tacit Dimension

How could we analyse others and other cultures? The "understanding" of objective phenomena should not be undertaken only by the determination of the significance of behaviour or people by the observers. The observers have to possess a deeper knowledge of the aspects of the observed object. In order to know the specific meanings of behaviour properly, observers have to possess the background of that meaning in the objective society. Hence, as Peter Winch （1995）has argued, the observer needs to possess the "internal sense" or "inner sense" of that observed object and objective society. The reasons of man's behaviour or the meanings which are commonly possessed by a group cannot be demonstrated in a clear or positive way. The observed behaviour of the subjects is not enough to give us absolute knowledge of the phenomenon. Only through prolonged exposure to the observed people in their daily lives, can we hope to learn the "meaning" of their behaviour. Thus, to know other's or other culture's inner senses, field work is essential. More specifically, how can we know others' "internal sense of values" or the "inner senses" of another society? In other words, what is the cognitive structure of knowing these inner senses? As an answer to this question, I would like to discuss Michael Polanyi's theory of "tacit knowledge"（1983）.

（ａ）What is "tacit knowledge"?
According to Polanyi, "tacit knowledge" is the knowledge of contiguous items when one is looking at a phenomenon in a distant place. Polanyi explains the structure of tacit knowledge with the use of categorisations, such as "functional structure", "phenomenological structure"

and "existential structure". An essence of the structure of tacit knowledge is that each item which constitutes the observed whole object appears meaningful to the observer only when that observer looks at the whole object. Simultaneously, the observer can recognise the whole object in front of him through the presence of those elements. Hence, in this sense, the elements of the whole object are the conditions of cognising the meaning of the whole object for the observer. In short, tacit knowledge is the knowledge of contiguous elements which appear only if the whole object is observed. Simultaneously, it means that the whole object is recognised only through its elements of which the entire object consists. So, an object is the meaning of its elements. For instance, when we are looking at someone's face, his or her nose, mouth and lips are elements of his or her face. When we are looking at the whole object, we may think that we are recognising each element individually. But in fact, while we are attentive to the "whole" object, the knowledge of contiguous elements is so ambiguous that it is difficult to remember them clearly shortly after observation. We may think that the "eye" has its own meaning in itself, but actually, when the eye is observed as an element of the whole face, the eye only has meaning as an item of the entire object. The meaning of the elements depends on the whole object.

Polanyi's idea seems to be similar to gestalt psychology. Gestalt psychology also argues that things are recognised as meaningful within the structure of each element and the gestalt is where some sense is given to the elements as a part the whole. In terms of its basic structure, Polanyi agrees with the theory of gestalt psychology. However, Polanyi does not accept with every aspect of gestalt psychology.

> Gestalt psychology has assumed that perception of a physiognomy takes place through the spontaneous equilibration of its particulars impressed on the retina or on the brain. However, I am looking at Gestalt, on the contrary, as the outcome of an active shaping of experience performed in the pursuit of knowledge. This shaping or integrating I hold to be the great and indispensable tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered and, once discovered, is held to be true.[12]

Polanyi says that only when we are attentive to the whole object, may we have knowledge as a gestalt. What is the relationship between tacit knowledge and the question of inner sense? As mentioned above, we examine objects through their elements. So, the tacit knowledge of the elements is the condition for recognising the whole object. Though tacit knowledge occurs only when the whole object is recognised, this tacit knowledge or gestalt depends on the attentiveness of each subject who is observing that object. It is likely that even if observer A looks at the same object as observer B, from the same position, A's way of recognising Y will be totally different from that of B. This is because the tacit knowledge or gestalt of those observers' scopes are different. In order to recognise Y in the same way as B, A has to possess

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12) Michael Polanyi., Tacit Dimension., 1983.（Original 1966）　Grouceter, Mass Peter Smith.（p.6）

the same internal scope as B. This is the significance of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge determines the meaning of the whole object. If so, it is not enough to look at phenomena from the outside. It is also necessary to possess the same tacit knowledge as the observed persons. The most important thing here is that we have to know the things behind the phenomena. There are original gestalts in the phenomena of different place or different culture depending on the history or culture of that place. One's or a culture's tacit knowledge is a "substantial" thing which is actually owned by people. Polanyi's stance is against the assumption of empirical psychology. He supposes a "substantial Gestalt of knowledge behind" our behaviour. This does not mean that the observable outcomes are necessarily related to the underlying causes.

> And as in a scientific inquiry, many of the clues used will remain unspecifiable and may indeed be subliminal. Such is the effort by which we enter into the intimate structure of a skill or of a game of chess and get to know the powers of the person behind it. This is also the method by which a historian explores a historical personality. The structural kinship between knowing a mind and pursuing a scientific inquiry throws light on some further points obscured by the false assumption that we start acquiring the knowledge of a mind in themselves.[13]

（ｂ） How do we possess tacit knowledge?

How do we possess tacit knowledge? Polanyi answers this question by showing some examples. Polanyi gives the example of a rule of chess. The question here is how we can learn the rules of chess. The answer to this question is that while other players are playing chess, we are able to identify with the players of the game or with the game itself. By making a piece of chess with that player, we can "internalise" the rule of chess. Yes, it would be possible to claim that reading the manual is an easier way to learn the rules, but is that true? Even if one attempts to learn a rule of chess by studying its theory, in order to master that rule, one has to imagine the situation in one's mind. In fact, that new player has to practice playing the game in order to truly master the rule. Whilst playing the real game, that player can "internalise" the rules of chess and master them. Here, there is the same structure as above.

> It now becomes a means of making certain things function as the proximal terms of tacit knowing, so that instead of observing them in themselves, we may be aware of them in they constitute. It brings home to us that it is not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them, that we understand their joint meaning.[14]

This structure of learning also applies to the understanding of others' minds. Polanyi says that we are able to understand a professional chess player's mind in the same way as we learn the rules of chess. "Not by looking at things, but by dwelling in" the games of a professional chess player, we are able to "infiltrate" the mind of the professional chess player. In this way,

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13) *Ibid.* (p.31)
14) Michael Polanyi., Tacit Dimension, 1983. Grouceter, Mass Peter Smith. (p.18)

we can gain an understanding of that player's mind. Here, it seems that Polanyi has answered our question of how we can get to know the inner sense of others. If we apply Polanyi's theory to our question, we can internalise other people's rules of behaviour as we do the rules of a game. This structure of understanding others is also true on the group level. We can know other's internal dimensions by infiltration into them, "not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them".

（ｃ） The significance of the idea of tacit dimension
（１） Empirical Psychology

Empirical psychology's analysis starts from the obvious observable aspects of the subject's behaviour. This behaviour is the object of empirical psychology's analysis. A difficulty with this method is that that object's true preference may not be reflected in his or her observable behaviour. This is because we have our own senses of values in our minds which depend on the cultural environment of each individual or group. It is possible that an objective person's preference is determined by the observer according to that observer's interpretation of behaviour of that objective person whilst do not attempt to understand that objective person's true internal sense of value. For instance, when I was having strawberry shortcake, I started eating the sponge part and I did not touch the strawberry until the very end. To an observer, it would seem that my preference of the different parts was: "sponge, cream and then strawberry", Simply because my order of eating was as such. So, to that observer, it may have seemed that I dislike the strawberry part. However, the fact was that I was saving the best for last. Actually, I LOVE strawberries. If that observer judged, "This guy does not like strawberries" and if she took the strawberries for herself, I would be upset... This example tells us that even if some preferences of the objective person appear to be obvious to an observer, the truth may be totally different. If one outcome of one's preferential behaviour were supposed as the ultimate proof of a trait, this sort of misunderstanding is inevitable. In order to improve the approach based on empirical psychology, we must recognise the basic fact that we are more than just the material carriage of our preferences, but we are the subject who has some forms of taste and preference inside us. If materialised preferences are recognised as the evidence of our true preferences by an observer, that observer's conjecture of our real taste may be incorrect. If the basic supposition of empirical psychology is revised based on this view of ourselves, its theory will be better able to describe our true nature. The theory of tacit knowledge contributes to a cognitive theory for understanding the inner dimensions of others.

（２） Phenomenology

This method of analysis starts from our "intention" of consciousness. The object of analysis is the common subjectivity of people. A significance of this stance is that, a researcher can avoid the problem of neutral "objectivity" by not supposing the "substance" of things or supposing the "things themselves". Phenomenological analysis attempts to realise a sort of objectivity by supposing a "phenomenon" which is commonly recognised by our "intention" whilst putting the "substance" in parentheses. But, even if so, what are the specific "contents"

of that intention? What is the specific content of that commonly possessed subjectivity by some different cultural groups? As a research of social science, it is needed to know actual and specific contents of that recognisable phenomenon. Is there any significance for social science to argue about our social behaviour whilst putting the meaning of behaviour in "parentheses" whist ignoring the fact that the meaning of behaviour is possessed by actual subjects of behaviour? It seems to me that the phenomenological analysis, which originates from Edmund Husserl, is the replacement of the analysis of substance into the analysis of our commonly possessed intention. The existence of substance was made relative by that replacement. Polanyi's stance is antagonistic to this Phenomenological approach as well as to the empirical psychological approach. Polanyi rather supposes our mind as a "substance"（not a phenomenon）and man's inner world is supposed as a "personal" thing. But, in terms of this personality of our mind, Polanyi does not deny a presence of our common knowledge. Polanyi's argument describes the process of our learning of other minds by our "infiltration" into other minds.

（3）Psychoanalysis

A problem with the method of Psychoanalysis is that the subject interpreting an object takes on the role of a "god" who provides the meaning of every behaviour of that observed object. In this case, any explanation is possible for the behaviour of that observed object. Here there is a methodological danger which was criticised by Karl Popper（2002）with his concept of "falsifiability". A danger that should be noted here is that this "unfalsifyable approach" prescribes meanings to behaviour of the observed object from that observer's cultural background. Ultimately, it is true that the reason why this Psychoanalytical approach is labelled as an "anything goes" method is that the observer can give any meaning he chooses to the behaviour of others. I would like to note here that the observer's personal sense of value is formed in his specific cultural background. Even if that observer's analysis is approved in a certain cultural group as an appropriate analysis, it is possible that the approach will not be appropriate for understanding other groups in the different cultural background. Ultimately, most of our academic knowledge is discovered by somebody as their personal interpretation, and is called "knowledge". In this sense, we cannot help relying on someone's personal interpretation. At least it has to be avoided that some different cultural group's common sense of value contained in the study of Psychoanalysis is coerced to the other different cultural groups.

（4）Rational Choice Theory

Rational Choice theory assumes a rationality of behaviour of objects. A problem of rational choice theory is that some specific "rationality" is based on one's specific cultural background. So there is a danger that a conception of rationality is "oppressed" to the social phenomenon without understanding the intentions or meanings existing in those objective people. Or, rather, a danger of the method of rational choice theory is that the conception of "rationality" itself may be adapted to the other different cultures unconditionally. A theoretical basis of rational choice theory is that we are aware of the alternatives of our choice and we are motivated by the rationality to choose certain options. The problem with rational choice theory is that it

does not take into account our internal sense of values or the meanings of those alternatives. Thus rational choice theory tends to understand people's behaviour only by the "outcomes" of people's choice. In the case of microeconomics theory, it is supposed that our preference is explained by the outcomes of our choices without supposing our sense of values. In other words, in economics, the subject of behaviour is supposed as a "wanton" being who does not possess some particular set or gestalt of preferences in his or her mind. However, in our common sense, it is clear that we have some particular sense of values depending on each person's history or different cultural background. Even though it is possible to interpret our preference wrongly, the outcomes of our choice are the reflection of our inner sense of values. Accordingly, due to the supposed existence of our free will, our choice can change according to the change of our inner sense of values. If a theory lacks awareness of this fact, the description of the phenomena of our choices or behaviour will be nothing but a reflection of some limited ideas of economics. In that case, that economic explanation will be far from an understanding of the real roots of behaviour. This structure is similar to the relationship between Hegel and Napoleon. Even though Napoleon seemed to be a realisation of the "spirit of world" for Hegel, Napoleon would not agree with Hegel's opinion. Simply because Napoleon did not know Hegel's metaphysical philosophy. Theorists of economics want to give meanings to the behaviours of people according to their theory based on the idea of rationality. Such a method is a long way from understanding the true nature of our behaviour. Only if a subject of behaviour is conscious of his or her behaviour, can rational choice theory hold persuasiveness. Otherwise, any behaviour can be justified as a rational behaviour after the event. This constitutes nothing but a coercion of the observer's conception of rationality. For rational choice explanations to be reasonable, the internal senses of values of the observed subject have to be understood. Since the sense of values depends on each individual, rationality must depend on each individual. This means that if one's internal the observer understands sense of values; rational choice theory can maintain its validity. However, even if sense of values is thought of as a personal thing, it is also true that some basic sense of values is common in the group of people across its members. Here, there is a necessity for analysis of the sense of values in the group level. There must be a different rationality depending on different cultural backgrounds. In order to modify such a monotonous, simple economic theory, some other suppositions of the subject of behaviour will be needed. Sen suggests carrying out a "meta-ranking" of our preferences to explain our behaviours.

> I have proposed elsewhere - at the 1972 Bristol conference on "practical reason" - that we need to consider rankings of preference rankings to express our moral judgements. I would like to discuss this structure a bit more. A particular morality can be viewed, not just in terms of the "most moral" ranking of the set of alternative actions, but as a moral ranking of the ranking of the rankings of action … Let X be the set of alternative and mutually exclusive combinations of actions under consideration, and let Y be the set of rankings of the elements of X. A ranking of the set Y（consisting of action-rankings）will be called a meta-ranking of action-set X. It is my claim that a particular ranking of the action-set X is not articulate enough to express much about a given morality, and a more robust format

is provided by choosing a meta-ranking of actions（that is, a ranking of Y rather than X）. [15]

A significance of this introduction of "meta-ranking" is that the subject of behaviour is not supposed as a "wanton" Homo-economics. A model of man with meta-ranking or meta-preference is much closer to our innate understanding of ourselves. We have a capacity for self - reflection. Also, we can objectify ourselves. In other words, we have a capacity to become a "third party" to ourselves. Thanks to this capacity, we can change our tastes or senses of values. When one smoker receives some information about the relationship between cancer and smoking, he or she will reflect this in his or her behaviour. If he or she decides to live long, he or she may chose to stop smoking by his or her own decision as a result of reflection in his or her mind. Our behaviour is determined by our inner self which is influenced by information from outside sources.

> It should mention, however, that the structure demands much more information than is yielded by the observation of people's actual choices, which would at most reveal only the ranking C. It gives a role to introspection and to communication. [16]

If so, it would not be plausible to analyse our behaviour without understanding our internal world such as our sense of values or internal meanings given to things in the external world. It sounds plausible that the outcomes of our preferences are the reflection of taste. Nevertheless, we ourselves are not just the products of our choices. In other words, it would be impossible to know or judge an objective person from a glance at the set of his or her choices. The reason why an option was chosen by an objective person is that he or she had some particular inclination to which certain meanings are attached. This is the reason why we have to know that objective person's internal sense of value and the meanings of the choices. In another way, the contents of danger of rational choice theory is to be explained that "gestalt" of meanings which is possessed by observer is oppressed to the objective phenomena without understanding the "gestalt" of objective individual or groups in the different world of senses. Or, if it is explained as in the former argument of meta-preference, a danger of rational choice explanations is that the observer attempts to understand the objective person's meta-preference from materialised preferences of that objective person according to that observer's meta-preference.

To some extent one's meta-ranking or meta-preference is based on style of behaviour, social custom, meanings of the things and behaviours. Although, as it has been argued, we have a capacity to objectify ourselves and become a third party of ourselves in our mind. We can reflect ourselves by ourselves. This is a condition for the fact that we can change our set of

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15）Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: Choice, Welfare and Measurement., Basil Blackwell., 1982.（p.100）
16）*Ibid.*（p.102）

preference to another set. This capacity of objectification of ourselves is also needed as a condition for analysing other different objects. As Max Weber argued, it would be impossible for us to become an entire third party of ourselves. Nevertheless, if we are always with ourselves in our consciousness, our research of the others will become an entire coercion of ourselves to the observed objects. If so there will be no room of "understanding" of the others. Even if we are influenced by others, it does not necessarily mean by we are "brainwashed" by the observed others. We can infiltrate into the objects of analysis and we attempt to embody with the objects of our research, but we are conscious of this behaviour while we are doing so as a third party to both the objects and ourselves. Here, there is a possibility of understanding the observed others in our consciousness. But how do we know others' internal dimension? Again, Polany's theory of tacit dimension has given an answer to this question. By knowing produced outcomes of the objective person or group of people as clues of that person's or their internal sense of values or meanings, we can infiltrate into the internal dimension of that objective individual or group of people. While we are remaining our original sense of values and meanings about the things which have been formed by our native life environment, we can understand internal dimension of the others. Here, there is a theoretical possibility of understanding others appropriately while remaining identity of observer's sense of value.

（5）Conceptual Analysis（Ideal Types）

There is a danger that the situation of different societies is absorbed into some key concepts which were produced against a different cultural background in the different sense of values and meanings. There are some concepts which are familiar with our study such as "democracy", "feudalism", "male dominating society" or "developing society". Observer's interpretation of certain "outcomes" or "phenomena" of objective society may be matched to these conceptions. But, if they lack of "inner sense" of that objective society, an analysis with those key conceptions may become an oppression of observer's sense of value which is possessed in that observer's society commonly. For instance, on a custom of "circumcision" of female（and in some cases to male as well）in a culture, some feminists have been strongly against it as saying it is a brutal violence to female and impair of women's dignity（or dignity of human）. But, in this case, the conceptions "women's dignity" and "dignity of human" are not possessed commonly with those "sufferers of brutal custom". On the contrary, those "barbarous" people, including those females, may think that such an way of understanding is full of "officiousness" with wrong understandings of them. Simultaneously, we cannot recognise the things in the world without a conception as a scope of our cognition. Nevertheless, there is a problem of "oppression" of that scope of cognition in this method. This is the very problem. If so, is there any solution to this problem? I think there is. Even though we cannot dispose of our conceptions entirely, we can explain the contents and meaning of our conceptions in great detail We do not have to put the social phenomena into the form of too simple diagram. As our knowledge of the objects of research will be increasing with our appropriate understanding, observer's explanation of the object will be complicated. But, this is a natural thing. In order to overcome a difficulty of conceptual analysis, it is necessary to understand the objects including their inner sense by the infiltration into the objects as Polanyi has argued. Then, the

observer has to be attentive to his or her usage of conceptions. In the research, it must be required to give a detailed explanation of the things to avoid misunderstanding of the object of research or oppressing mono cultural conceptions to the object of research.

Conclusion

As I have argued, the wrong approach to the others and different cultures may be caused by the wrong image conceived by ignorant people. As Charles Taylor discusses, this is a cause of misrecognition between people. Since we cannot help possessing some perspectives and scopes for looking at the things, ultimately, it is impossible to see the truth without some "prejudices". But, we also have a capacity to revise our primitive scopes of recognising others to more reasonable scopes which are recognised by the "object" of analysis as appropriate scopes. Polanyi's argument about tacit knowledge has given a very important suggestion to this problem. As we needed political psychology and comparative political culture to be attentive to the danger of oppressive "stereotypes" of the others, the researchers also need to be attentive to themselves for not become the very provider of those distorted "stereotype" scopes In order to understand others appropriately, methodological argument will be needed much more. If appropriate cognitive method is not accompanied with the research, our "quality" of understanding of others or objects of research will not be improved even if a "quantity" of our research will be increased. To avoid conflicts between individuals and groups which are caused by distorted or wrong "stereotyped" images, we have to understand each other in the proper way. It is certain that it will take more time to solve the problems raised by Walter Lippmann.

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