Adam Smith's theory of sympathy and contemporary culturally diverse society.

（Ⅰ）

Hiroyuki ISHIMATSU

Abstract

In this paper, I approach the question of how we can realise social cement in a contemporary culturally diverse society, with reference to Adam Smith's theory of sympathy depicted in his "A theory of moral sentiment." （First edition 1759, Sixth edition 1790） Smith thought that sympathy as fellow-feeling was a foundation of social relations and justice in society and this idea is still valid when thinking of relating to people of different cultural backgrounds in contemporary culturally diverse society. First, I outline Smith's theory of sympathy by focusing on its relevance to social relations. Second, I analyse the significance of Smith's idea of sympathy in a contemporary culturally diverse society and relate it to the concepts of recognition and toleration that have frequently appeared in the course of discussion of culturally diverse society. My idea is that sympathy with others is considered an authentic form of recognition at a sentimental level, and therefore sympathy as fellow-feeling in society should be more actively supported as a necessary element in a contemporary culturally diverse society than tolerance, although the latter is still another necessary element in a pluralist society. Based on these arguments, I analyse the conditions for realising sympathy as fellow-feeling in a culturally diverse society. I stress that negative images of "others" depicted in the mass media and more explicit expressions in public speech are hindrances to fellow-feeling in a culturally diverse society. I suggest resolving these problems by means of legal controls and media literacy education. Promoting communication among different groups of people in society is also recommended as another solution to moderate relations between them. The paper concludes with two case studies set in a contemporary culturally diverse society – Japan – from the perspective of sympathy. The first concerns the Japanese government's multicultural coexistence policy and Hamamatsu city's local vision, which is introduced as a positive case. The second is a recent chauvinistic hate speech movement against Korean and North Korean residents, which is critically examined from the perspective of a need for sympathy in society. I will also introduce counter legal measures against it that have been adopted in Japan. Active countermeasures in the light of the need for fellow-feeling in society are suggested.

Table of contents（Ⅰ）

Introduction

How can we realise social cement in a contemporary culturally diverse society at a more substantial level? In this paper, I will approach this theme from the perspective of Adam Smith's theory of sympathy, which was set out in his "A theory of moral sentiment"（First edition 1759, Sixth edition 1790）（hereafter TMS）.　The reason why I discuss this theory is because I believe this idea is still meaningful as a perspective from which to analyse the ongoing reality of a culturally diverse society and for thinking about how to develop harmonious relations among the people in society. Smith argued that sympathy with another's joy or sorrow by imaginary change of situation is a natural human phenomenon. According to Smith, this principle of sympathy is the foundation of our judgement of the correctness of one's own or other's behaviours with reference to one's inner impartial spectator. Since our moral judgement is based on our sharing of feelings with others, our moral norms are also sharable within society as a norm of propriety of behaviour. Smith thought that sympathy as fellow-feeling lies at the foundations of social relations and justice in society.

If so, in a contemporary culturally diverse society, how is Smith's insight to be interpreted? My answer is that his theory of sympathy is meaningful when thinking of relations between peoples of different cultural backgrounds in society as members of society whilst they maintain their different identities. In the literature on culturally diverse societies, the focus has been put on the limits and range of acceptance of different cultural practices as individual or group rights. In political theory and sociology studies of culturally diverse societies, the need and justification for "tolerance" or "recognition" of the practices of minority cultures, such as costumes or dietary customs, has been highlighted. In cases where society has accepted immigrants or refugees with different cultural values, the possibility and limits of tolerance of their practices has been discussed. In other cases where certain ethnic groups legitimately coexist for historical reasons, rights to preserve and reproduce ethnic culture have been justified at the institutional level（e.g. Quebec in Canada; aboriginal groups in Australia or New Zealand）.

The reason why I discuss the theory of Adam Smith of over 300 years ago is that his view on the nature of human beings and society has universal value and is still valid and significant for understanding contemporary society. The theories of sympathy that were founded by Scottish Enlightenment theorists such as David Hume and Adam Smith have been mainly developed in the fields of social psychology, psychoanalysis and ethnology. However, I believe that these theories of sympathy, especially Smith's idea of sympathy, have abundant potential in the field of political theory when examining views and challenges relating to culturally diverse societies of today. The aim of this paper is to provide and justify a perspective of sympathy as fellow-feeling that will be valuable when thinking of approaches to contemporary culturally diverse society. I will apply this perspective to the reality of a culturally diverse society and attempt to indicate policies to resole the problems

highlighted.[1]

This paper is organised as follows. In the opening chapter, I outline Adam Smith's theory of sympathy by focusing on its view of social relations. Smith regarded sympathy as a source of moral judgement and fellow-feeling and he asserted that sympathy as fellow-feeling is an essential element of a society that is comprised of multiple agents. In the second chapter, the significance of sympathy as formulated by Smith regarding contemporary culturally diverse society is analysed in relation to the concepts of recognition and tolerance that have frequently appeared in the course of discussion of culturally diverse societies. My idea is that sympathy with others is considered an authentic form of recognition at our sentimental level; therefore, sympathy as fellow-feeling in society should be supported as a necessary element in contemporary culturally diverse societies more actively than tolerance, although the latter is still another necessary element of a pluralist society. In this chapter, I also examine the significance of sympathy with others in the light of economic equality and liberty. In the third chapter, the conditions for realising sympathy as fellow-feeling in a culturally diverse society are examined. I stress that a negative image of "others" depicted in the mass media and more explicit expressions in public speech are hindrances to fellow-feeling in a culturally diverse society. To resolve those problems, legal controls and media literacy education are suggested, together with moderating social relations by promoting communication among groups of people in society. In the fourth chapter, as a case study of a contemporary culturally diverse society from the perspective of sympathy, I examine the Japanese government's multicultural coexistence policy and Hamamatsu city's local vision as positive applications of my thesis. In a second case study, I a discuss recent chauvinistic hate-speech movement in Japan against Korean and North Korean residents as a negative situation demonstrating an absence of fellow-feeling in society. In this part, I also suggest some active countermeasures. This is followed by the conclusion.

    This paper is based on my doctoral thesis, which was submitted to the University of Newcastle upon Tyne in 2006, entitled "Sympathy as a foundation of multicultural "society" - A dialogue with Adam Smith". In my thesis, I discussed the potential of Adam Smith's concept of sympathy for the analysis of contemporary multicultural society. However, this paper is a development of my thesis and differs in the following ways:

1 . In my thesis, I took the position that sympathy is a necessary element for belonging to a multicultural society and I did not give a detailed account of the relation between sympathy and recognition. However, in the present paper I interpret Adam Smith's concept of sympathy as a radical form of recognition at a sentimental level.

2 . In this paper, whilst agreeing with the account of Tzvetan Todorov, I explain the mother-child relationship as the basic origin of the need for sympathy.

3 . I discus the difference between the need for sympathy of humans and other higher animals by referring to the ethological research of Frans De Waal.

4 . In this paper, I discuss recent cases of Japanese culturally diverse situations, both positive and negative, in order to explore the possibility of the application of the concept of sympathy.

    Regarding the following points, my thesis goes into a greater level of detail in its discussion: the relationship between the concept of sympathy and communitarian theory; the danger of viewing others with prejudice and through stereotypes; refutations of incommensurability of different senses of values.

Chapter 1: Sympathy and society: Adam Smith's theory of sympathy

1．Adam Smith's concept of sympathy

（1）Sympathy as human nature

　Adam Smith developed his moral theory of sympathy in "The theory of moral sentiment"（1790）. This book begins with the following sentences, stating that sympathy is a part of our nature,

> How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it（Smith, TMS, I, i, 1, s1）.

　Smith's ethics and social theory are founded on the principle of sympathy with others being an obvious part of human nature. The level of virtue present in individuals my vary, but sympathy is a universally recognised phenomenon in the lives of all people.

（2）Sympathy or empathy?

　In order to avoid confusion of terminology, the difference between sympathy and empathy needs to be explained. In addition to sympathy, the term empathy has been used to describe phenomena of sharing the sentiments of others. In Smith's "Theory of moral sentiment", 'sympathy' is used consistently, whereas empathy is often employed to discuss Smith's theory today. In fact, the term empathy did not exist in Smith's time but was created later. Empathy was originally used as a translation of the German "einfuhlung", which was adopted by the German philosopher Robert Vischer in 1873 in his theory of aesthetics. Later, Theodor Lipps, a German psychologist, employed "empathie" to describe the meaning of "einfuhlung", based on the corresponding Greek word "empatheia" denoting interpersonal psychological phenomena. In 1909, the American psychologist Edward Titchener started to use 'empathy' in today's sense as of entering into another's state of mind, as a translation of Lipps's 'empathie'（Jahoda 2005, Nakajima 2006, 228-229）. Different views about employing 'sympathy' or 'empathy' to discuss Smith's theory can be partly due to different interpretations of Smith's idea. In general, empathy is understood and used in the sense of entering into another's feeling and "the ability to understand and share the feelings of another"（OED 2005）. Both terms share a meaning of "common feeling". However, sympathy holds the

sense of a "feeling of pity and sorrow for someone else's misfortune"（OED 2005）in today's common understanding. With regard to Smith's theory of sympathy, his conception of sympathy not only means synchronisation with another's sorrow, but rather Smith says that we can share others' sentiments to some extent, whether they are positive or negative. The level of sympathy felt by imagining a change of situation should be weaker than that felt by the object. Nevertheless, in a different place he mentions that sympathy with another's joy is weaker than sympathy with another's sorrow because of envy of the joy（TMS,I,iii,1,s4-s10）. On the other hand, whereas empathy is an attempt to take the perspective of its object, Smith's idea of sympathy also contains the subject's interest in the circumstance and sentiment of the object. In fact, the American psychologist Laurence Wispe argues that the concept of sympathy contains nuances of the subject wishing to work on the object's distress and comfort it（Wispe 2010）and, at this point, Smith's sympathy can be distinguished from an interest in the object's circumstance as mere information to be taken advantage of. In this sense, Smith's idea is further from empathy and rather closer to sympathy. Following these reasons, apart from quotations from works by others, henceforth I will use the term 'sympathy' in discussing Smith's theory.

（3）Sympathy as an outcome of cognition of the situation and imagination of the object

　　David Hume, a previous user of the concept of sympathy, explains the nature of sympathy with the metaphor of strings resonating（Hume 1978, 224）. However, Smith understands the phenomenon of sympathy with its object as the outcome of cognising an imaginary change of situation.

　　　That this is the source of our fellow-feeling for the misery of others, that it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels, may be demonstrated by many obvious observations, if it should not be thought sufficiently evident of itself（Smith, TMS, I, i, 1, s3）.

　　Thanks to the imaginative power endowed in us by nature, we can reproduce the sentiments of the object of observation in ourselves. This exchange of positions is considered to be a source of fellow-feeling among the general public in a society, because of the fact that one can be the object of another's observation while at the same time being a spectator of the same object（s）in society. Therefore, one is not merely an isolated subject who is freed from the gaze of others, but instead one is a subject who is always viewed by others and is aware of becoming an object of observation of others.

（4）Sympathy as an altruistic sentiment towards others

　　Hume states that the source of sympathy is utility and we sympathise with others, because of a benefit from doing so. Against this view, Smith insists that sympathy is not valuable because of a direct or indirect utility to ourselves that can be discovered by a reflective process.（Smith, TMS, I, i, 4, s1）Rather, sympathy is assumed to be a natural and altruistic phenomenon that can frequently be observed in our everyday life. For instance,

Smith writes that when he sympathises with a man who has lost his only son, he sympathises with the sorrow of the man even though he has not had this experience in his life. Smith follows this explanation with his account of the nature of this phenomenon:

> But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations with the person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize（Smith, TMS, VII, iii, 1, s4）.

In fact, a man sympathises with the pain of a lady who is delivering a baby through an "imaginary change of situation" with her in spite of not being capable of having the same experience in his life（Smith, TMS,VII,iii,1,s4）.

（5）Sympathy that holds intrinsic value as fellow-feeling

In the view of Smith, we have a strong need to be sympathised with by others. The ultimate reason for this lies in the fact that there is an intrinsic value in feeling a sense of unity with others in our nature: we are orientated towards desiring a sense of unity by being sympathised with by others.

> But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary（Smith, TMS, I, i, 2, s1）.

Being sympathised with by others leads to joy and an absence of sympathy from others is a cause of sadness. This is due to the fact that sharing a sentiment with others has an intrinsic value in itself. In order to illustrate this, Smith gives the example of jesting in public and the reaction of one's audience. We feel pleasure when our companions are amused by our jest and otherwise we feel distressed（Smith, TMS, I, i, 2, s1）. Smith views this joy and sorrow from a reaction to jests as not deriving from utility of the outcome.

> Neither does his pleasure seem to arise altogether from the additional vivacity which his mirth may receive from sympathy with theirs, nor his pain from the disappointment he meets with when he misses this pleasure; though both the one and the other, no doubt, do in some measure（Smith, TMS, I, i, 2, s2）.

In other words, sympathising or being sympathised with has an intrinsic value that does not require further explanation in terms of utility or consequential benefit. In general we comfort our grief by being sympathised with by others in our confession（Smith, TMS, I, i, 2, s4）. This is due to the fact that we feel unity instead of isolation or alienation from the sympathy of others. According to Smith, this sentimental unity is an essential part of the cement between people as social beings.

> Though your judgments in matters of speculation, though your sentiments in matters of taste, are quite opposite to mine, I can easily overlook this opposition; and if I have any degree of temper, I may still find some entertainment in your conversation, even upon those very subjects. But if you have either no fellow-feeling for the misfortunes I have met with, or none that bears any proportion to the grief which distracts me; or if you have either no indignation at the injuries I have suffered, or none that bears any proportion to the resentment which transports me, we can no longer converse upon these subjects. We become intolerable to one another. I can neither support your company, nor you mine (Smith, TMS, I, i, 4, s5).

Sympathy has an intrinsic value as sentimental unity, and with those who do not show a sympathetic attitude towards others we cannot become friends. Of course, the level of sentiment must differ depending on the relationship. In general, sentimental relations with one's kin must be closer than those with colleagues in an office. Nevertheless, whether it is weaker or stronger, sentimental unity is considered to be a necessary element of human relations, and this is also true of general human relations in society.

2．Sympathy as a foundation of morality and justice in society
（1）Moral judgement is founded on sentiment rather than reason

The Scottish Enlightenment philosophers in the 18th century, including Smith and Hume, are often called sentimentalists. This owes to the fact that they argued that moral judgement, of "ought" or "ought not", is performed by our moral sentiments instead of through abstract and calculative reason. They asserted that the nature of moral judgement is approval or disapproval of some behaviour and this sense is equal to our inner feelings corresponding to the behaviour (Morrow 1969). Together with other Scottish Enlightenment moral theorists such as Hutchison and Hume, Smith views the very subject of our moral judgement as being our sentiment and not reason. Sympathy as a form of sharing sentiment is proposed and analysed by Hume and Smith as the theoretical evidence for the possibility of our having a common moral judgement in society. The fact that we share sentiments of joy or sorrow with others in society also indicates that we can make moral judgements that are shared with others in society. However, the mechanism and nature of sympathy differs between Hume and Smith.

（2）Sympathy as a principle of approval and denial of behaviour

Hume (1998) sees our moral judgement of another's action originating in common utility and the possibility of sympathy with the behaviour. Therefore, for Hume it results from reflection.[2] Smith, in contrast, views the possibility of our sympathy lying in the cause and motives for the behaviour and not its merit. Moreover, Smith reiterates that we sympathise with others without reflecting on utility or benefit to us.

2）In chapter 5 of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1998), Hume discusses utility not only as the source of moral judgement but also as the source of aesthetical judgement.

> We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments and motives which directed it（Smith, TMS, III, i, s2）.

Therefore, our moral judgement results from non-reflective sentimental approbation or disapprobation.

（3）The inner "impartial spectator" for unselfish moral judgement

In cases of moral judgement of our own or others' behaviour in which our sentiment may be biased by our self-love or self-interest, we should consult our inner impartial spectator by reflecting, by objectifying ourselves in our mind. In Smith's words, "Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man"（Smith, TMS, II, ii, 2, s1）. To avoid this bias and enable us to conduct impartial moral judgement of others and ourselves, we need to consult our inner impartial spectator for a general view of others that has been internalised in our life.

> It is he who shows us the propriety of generosity and the deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves（Smith, TMS, III, 3, s4）.

In order to secure impartiality in our moral judgement, we need an inner impartial spectator as a judge in our inner high court.

（4）Justice as the main pillar of society and sympathy as a foundation of justice

In terms of the contents of social justice, Smith discusses safety of life and limb, security of property, and the obligation of oaths, promises, and contracts（Smith, TMS, II, ii）. Justice with these contents is, however, recognised as a negative virtue. In Smith's words, on most occasions justice is "a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour"（Smith, TMS, II, ii, 2, s9）, yet justice functions as "the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice"（Smith, TMS, II, ii, 3, s4）. In fact, justice has a key value as the foundation of society.

> If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society, that fabric which to raise and support seems in this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar and darling care of Nature, must in a moment crumble into atoms（Smith, TMS, II, ii, 3, s4）.

This can be compared with acts of beneficence, which have a less valuable function in society and which can be described as "the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building"（Smith, TMS, II, ii, 3, s4）. Hume, however, emphasises that the rules of justice originate in their general utility to society（Hume 1998, 92）. He holds

that the reason why justice as an artificial virtue, especially that relating to the security of property rights, is maintained in society by convention among its members and is observed is due to its common utility and people's sympathy with that utility（Hume 2000, 11）. Smith disagrees with this view of Hume's attributing moral judgement and justice to utility to society（Smith, TMS, IV, 2, s3）. For Smith, the origin of the legitimacy of social justice is not the result of reflection on public interest or utility.

> All men, even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society, how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be（Smith, TMS, II, ii, 3, s9）.

Instead, Smith considers that the reason why justice is observed in our society is because of our shared sense of interest in society and feeling of unity with society. For instance, if injurious treatment or the murder of a member of society is discovered, the it is necessary to claim proper punishment for that injustice because "The concern which is requisite for this, is no more than the general fellow-feeling which we have with every man merely because he is our fellow-creature"（Smith, TMS, II, ii, 3, s10）. In other words, in Smith's account, on the one hand, justice is recognised as a foundation of society that is more important and valuable than voluntary acts of beneficence. On the other hand, the element that upholds justice is fellow-feeling for the members of society as a sense of unity.

3．Society and sympathy
（1）Sympathy as a weaker sentiment than self-love or self-interest
Smith considers that we humans are both sympathetic and selfish beings at the same time. In his view, we are endowed by the author of nature with the ability to sympathise with others（Smith, TMS, III, 2, s31）and this ability enables us to perform moral judgement through the sense of approval or disapproval and the presence of justice. In fact, sympathy is assumed to be a weaker sentiment than self-love or self-interest and, therefore, it is natural for us to give priority to our self-love or self-interest over sympathy with others. Smith explains this in the following sentences:

> In the same manner, to the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss or gain of a very small interest of our own appears to be of vastly more importance, excites a much more passionate joy or sorrow, a much more ardent desire or aversion, than the greatest concern of another with whom we have no particular connexion（Smith, TMS, III, 3, s3）.

Because of this propensity, an impartial spectator is required to perform impartial moral judgement. However, due to its nature as a powerful driving force to satisfy our desires, our self-interest has the advantage of making us industrious and consequently contributing to social welfare. Smith admires the elaborate fact that our activities motivated by self-love or

self-interest fall within the range of those sympathised with by others as a deception of nature. As in his other work, "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations"（1993）, that people's actions based on their desire for profit results in public welfare is explained as the principle of the market economy in "The theory of moral sentiment". Here, he argues that the rich, in spite of "their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires"（Smith, TMS, IV, 1, s10）, are led by "an invisible hand", and "without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species"（Smith, TMS, IV, 1, s10）. In the same manner, the poor man's son strives to gain wealth to satisfy his vanity by longing for the circumstances of the rich man（Smith, TMS, IV, 1, s8）. The truth that wealth and greatness are incapable of "procuring ease of body or tranquillity of mind"（Smith, TMS, IV, 1, s8）appears to both of them only at a very late stage in their lives when they are approaching death（Smith, TMS, IV, 1, s8）.

With these realities of society, however, our self-love or self-interest seems to be a prerequisite for sympathy with others. The concept of sympathy presupposes identity and self-love of the subject. In order for me to sympathise with you, I have to share understanding of your circumstances and I need to feel the same kind of sentiment in myself. The reason why I am altruistic about your circumstances is owing to the fact that I can project my own sentiments to you by an imaginary change of situation. The thing you want to be done is shared by me. Hence, self-love is a condition for sympathy with another. Suppose that I were a subject lacking in self-consciousness without the identity of being "myself", like some insect that lives in a swarm merely by instinct; I should be equal to all the others in the swarm. In that case, subjective and active feelings of sympathising with others would not exist. Therefore, self-love and identity are also required as preconditions for sympathy with the other subject.

（2）Society as a condition for self-love and self-interest

Sympathy is a weaker sentiment than self-love or self-interest. The wealth and great reputation that are the aims of self-love and self-interest depend on a shared vanity that needs to attract the attention and admiration of others. This vanity is internalised through the gaze of others; that self-love or self-interest can be considered a stronger sentiment than sympathy is conditional on being seen by others in society. If I lived in a completely isolated world, I would not be able to satisfy my need of survival. Even if I could survive, I would not be able to feel self-love or self-interest through understanding what I am, and therefore I should not be able to experience vanity at all. This is explained by Smith as follows:

Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own

face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view.（Smith, TMS, III, 1, s3）

Society functions as a mirror to show what one is. By entering society and living there we gain the ability to look at ourselves from another's point of view. This ability enables us to feel self-love or self-interest and a sense of vanity（Smith, TMS, III, 1, s5）. Because of this, living in society is considered a necessary condition for the presence of self-love or self-interest.

（3）Sympathy as a foundation of society

In summary, sympathy is a necessary element for society and society is considered to be the ground for self-love or self-interest. Smith says that, in fact, we do not sympathise with other's misery as much as with ours. According to Smith, "These two sentiments, however, may, it is evident, have such a correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society. Though they will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required"（Smith, TMS, I, i, 4, s7）. Sympathy is a weaker sentiment than self-love or self-interest, however, such a self-oriented sentiment as self-love or self-interest requires society as its prerequisite. At the same time, society requires fellow-feeling, as a sense of unity and justice is founded on that ground. In fact, this logic seems to be self-referential. Smith describes the rationality of society as the deception of nature or an endowment from "the great Author of our nature". Smith's moral philosophy and economics describe the idea that society holds a given functional rationality and his theories are interpretations of the reality of society. The transcendent being, "the great Author of our nature", or God, is used as a metaphor for the cause of the phenomena of the world. This worldview of Smith's reminds us of a famous sentence in the preface to "Philosophy of Right" by G.W.F. Hegel: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational"（Hegel 1975, 10）. In our world, where there no transcendent rationality can be supposed, the thing that is needed to govern society is a balancing of our natural sentiments of self-love or self-interest and sympathy with other members. In our mind, selfish and altruistic sentiments co-exist and we have a natural tendency for self-interest to be stronger than sympathy with others. Yet, even at a weaker level, sympathy enables us to retain interests in others circumstances and to be able to share joy and sorrow with others. As well as altruistic sentiments, self-love is necessary, because by having this self-oriented sentiment we can share others' self-love through an imaginary change of situation, even though the level of sentiment is weaker than self-love. Moreover, the level of sympathy depends on the type of relationship and the distance to the object. The sentimental bond with family members or close friends is generally stronger than bonds with others. Even with these features, sympathy as sentimental cement is at any rate considered an important element in a society that is composed of agents who do not have close relationships each other in order to maintain society as a substantial unit.

Chapter 2: Culturally diverse society and sympathy

The sharing sentiment is, more or less, a familiar phenomenon to all of us, whether it is experienced in public or private. According to recent ethological studies, a number of sympathetic phenomena have been observed in other animals too. The Dutch ethologist Frans De Waal（2010）argues that sympathetic behaviour is not a privilege of human beings. There is various evidence of the presence of sympathy in the world of animals, especially in the ecology of higher animals such as chimpanzees or bonobos. According to De Waal, our sympathetic behaviour is a result of our past evolutionary history with these other animals.

> True, biology is usually called upon to justify a society based on selfish principles, but we should never forget that is has also produced the glue that holds communities together. This glue is the same for us as for many other animals. Being in tune with others, coordinating activities, and caring for those in need aren't restricted to our species. Human empathy has the backing of a long evolutionary history.（De Waal 2010, Location.42-45）

In his work, De Waal reports a number of sympathetic phenomena in animals that form groups, and through insights based on them De Waal suggests some guidelines for realising sympathy in human society. He optimistically stresses that, like other animals, human beings have innate strong instinct that drive us to support and cooperate with their fellows, even by sacrificing their own interest to some extent. Therefore, according to De Waal, sympathy at the social level is realised relatively easily by removing hindrances to it. With regard to this opinion, on the one hand it is true that we humans are one of the higher animals and therefore it is common sense that the same principles of other higher animals or mammals are applicable to humans. On the other hand, the question remains as to whether there is any particular need that is peculiar to human beings to realise sympathy in our society. If so, we may need to make some efforts that are particular to us to realise sympathy in our society. Compared to other animals, because of the constraints of a complex social life, the self or ego of humans must be much more complicated and different to the basic instinct that is shared with other animals. To some extent, we do share our propensities with other animals, but there must be some areas that are peculiar to humans. In the same way, the ability to feel sympathy has long existed in human beings as in other animals, and its form and processes of development must have some features identical to those of other animals. However, it has a more significant weight, especially in our modern society as a result of our existential sense in society.

If sympathy is a necessary element in our society in general, it must be meaningful to examine its significance in contemporary culturally diverse society. In order to tackle this theme, in this chapter, I will examine the significance of sympathy in comparison to

recognition and tolerance, which have also been argued to be necessary elements in a culturally diverse society. Furthermore, I will discuss the significance of sympathy in our culturally diverse society in the light of liberty and economic equality.

1．Recognition and sympathy

（1）Recognition as a theoretical ground of multiculturalism

In a general sense, recognition stands for "acknowledgement of the existence, validity, or legality of something"（OED 2005）and the act of recognising an object is possible in any sphere of our life. However, the idea of recognition in the politics of multicultural society tends to be used to justify the rights or status of minority groups in the official institutional sphere, and the term is often used as a theoretical ground for affirming a policy of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism as a politics of recognition is different from the form of tolerance where the presence and practices of minority cultures are nothing but objects of tolerance in society. A multiculturalism policy officially affirms the values and practices of objective minority cultures and grants the right to reproduce them with public support.

（2）Charles Taylor's theory of multiculturalism:

In the opening part of his famous work "Politics for Recognition"（1994）, Charles Taylor states that many issues of contemporary politics are driven by people's need for recognition.

> A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition. The need, it can be argued, is one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in politics. And the demand comes to the fore in a number of ways in today's politics, on behalf of minority or "subaltern" groups, in some forms of feminism and in what is today called the politics of "multiculturalism"（Taylor et al. 1994, 25）.

Taylor interprets people's identity as being their horizon of meaning of the world. The relationship between people's identity and recognition have changed in the modern period. Although identity used to be guaranteed by class hierarchy, with modernisation's removal of pre-given feudal status identity has become an object for individuals to acquire. Titles such as Mrs. Mr. or Ms. imply that equal respect should be given to people, which is to be distinguished from individually earned or predominantly inherited status. According to Taylor, the acquisition of identity or its maintenance is based on the authentic inner voice of each individual. However, the method of its realisation, or, say, the grammar of its expression, is gained through dialogue, study and conflict with others in our day-to-day life in society. Furthermore, there is a risk of a gap between my own self-understanding and others' understandings of me. Unless I am not recognised by others as I wish to be, I will feel frustrated. My identity of "what I am" depends, at any rate, on recognition by others. If I am treated as an inferior object by others, I suffer from misrecognition or lack of recognition as this is far from my own self-image. Regarding the power of distorted recognition by others, Taylor states:

misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can reflect a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need（Taylor et al. 1994, 26）.

In most contemporary civil societies, as long as one is the holder of citizenship, equality in the public sphere is guaranteed regardless of one's sexual orientation or ethnicity. However, in reality, in many de-facto culturally diverse societies, first class citizens and second class citizens are tacitly produced through various categories such as ethnicity, gender or handicap. Although the extent to which this idea can be universalised to other societies is unclear, in order to guarantee substantial equality in terms of cultural identity, Taylor justifies the idea of a double policy that provides universal equal rights to all citizens on the one hand and provides particular supplementary rights to maintaining and foster the culture of minority groups in society on the other hand. According to Taylor, cultural segregation of school education or the enforcement of French education for francophones in Canada is justifiable in the light of his idea of recognition-based multiculturalism（Taylor et al. 1994）.

（3）G.W.F. Hegel's theory of recognition as "the intuition of the self in its object".

Taylor quotes Hegel's idea of recognition in his theory of multiculturalism, but what does Hegel state about recognition? He describes recognition as an action by the subject cognising him/herself in the outside object. This can be paraphrased as an attempt to project the subject onto another object.

> The twofold significance of the distinct moments has in the nature of self-consciousness to be infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness in which it is posited. The detained exposition of the Notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will present us with the process of Recognition（Hegel 1977, 111）.

Hegel shows a "dialectic of the relationship of master and slave" as an ideal model of the process of recognition between men. This model was later developed by Alexandre Kojeve with an original interpretation in his work "Introduction to the Reading of Hegel"（1980）. The point of this model is that the subject who attempts to be recognised by another subject at risk of his life becomes a winner in the "struggle of recognition" and the loser who clings to his life becomes a loyal servant to the master, although at a later stage the positions are reversed as a result of the servant's cultivation of knowledge through his labour and the degeneration of the master. In this model, a struggle for power is depicted as a process of recognition by another subject. However, a struggle for power is not an inevitable component of Hegel's idea of recognition. As he writes in his early work, "Jena System"（1986）, the core of Hegel's idea of recognition is is instead to be found in the fact that the subject projects and recognises him/herself in the object, and the possibility of a struggle for power or cooperation is a way to reach that end. In other words, the essence of recognition of the object is "the intuition of the self in its object"（Hegel 1986）.

Our need for recognition is not necessarily accompanied by competition or a conflict over power. Moreover, our need for recognition by others not only regards social status but may concern many other aspects of our lives. Furthermore, recognition of the object can be expressed both visibly and invisibly or consciously and unconsciously (Todorov 2001, 77-78). In his "Phenomenology of Spirit" (1977), Hegel says that recognition is necessary for the existence of self-consciousness since both the acquisition and development of our self-consciousness depend on recognition by others.

> Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged (Hegel 1977, 111).

In a word, the essence of Hegel's idea is that recognition by others is a necessary condition for us to be ourselves.

(4) J.J. Rousseau's idea of recognition as the need for others' "gaze".

In "Life in common" (2001), the Bulgarian philosopher Tzvetan Todorov groups the level of presence of the things in this world into three categories, "to Be", "to Live" and "to Exist", and claims that these categories are irreducible to each other. According to Todorov, the level of "Being" is the same as that of any other kind of material and "Living" is the dimension that is shared with other living creatures. The level of "Existing" is unique in that is experienced only in the world of humans.[3]

> Man lives perhaps first of all in his skin, but he does not begin to exist except through the gaze of others, and without existence life itself dies out. Each of us is born twice, in nature and in society, to life and to existence. Both life and existence are fragile, but the dangers threatening them are not the same. Certainly, man is an animal, but that is not all he is (Todorov 2001, 54).

Adam Smith rejected the attribution of the nature of sympathy to its consequential utility by describing the nature of this sentiment and behaviour as intrinsically altruistic when we acknowledge another's situation without reference to any incurred utility. The nature of sympathy can be found in the fact that we partly share our being. The reason why I have this altruistic sentiment and behaviour towards another is that I recognise his/her circumstances as my own. Because of our nature of sharing being with each other, my assistance to you is beneficial to me as well, because in assisting you I reconfirm the fact that I am a common being with you. In other words, my altruism towards another functions

---

3) Todorov says that the need "to Live" is satisfied by care and the need "to Exist" is satisfied with recognition. In his understanding, the reason why a bloody image of conflict has been taken as the origin or model of recognition is partly owing to the fact that females previously lacked opportunities to describe mother-child relations of recognition (Todorov 2001). One of the reasons why the ethics of care have become popular in recent years must be related to increased opportunities to express observations regarding the care of children in public spaces.

as a form of recognition of what I am being shared with the object. Here, from the perspective of social existence, is a reason why sympathy has an intrinsic value that does not need to be reduced to its consequential utility.

According to Todorov, throughout the history of thought in the medieval and early modern period, the social sphere in which people shared their lives was not considered to be a necessary dimension of people's sense of existence. Instead, at that time, the social sphere was thought to be a space where lonely and egoistic individuals learned how to communicate whilst restraining their egoistic propensities. Because of this corrective effect, acting in the social sphere was valued above acting in the private sphere. The necessity of social life was justified by this passive reason. European intellectuals of the time before the modern age, such as Montaigne and Pascal, recognised a lonely and self-sufficient life as the ideal natural way to live. They considered communication with others to be a burden to be shed. In Todorov's view, both Hegel, who emphasised the need for recognition, and Smith, who underlined the necessity of sympathy with others, are students of Rousseau, in that they both thought social recognition to be an inevitable component of the sense of existence of modern man.

Todorov considers that Rousseau was a genius because he discovered the significance of the "gaze" of others as a decisive factor for our self understanding. Rousseau distinguished self-love（amour de soi）as an affirmative and universal desire of self-conservation and self-respect（amour propre）as a passion of vanity that desires superiority to others and he attempted social analysis from these points of view. In case we hold only a passion for superiority to others, our social relations with others is nothing but rivalry relations from which we need to gain victory whilst defeating others. However, in Rousseau's idea, we are described as an imperfect being that demand the looks of others to recognise what we are. This means that in order for us to think ourselves as equal to others, we need equal consideration from society. Public and standard form of consideration is a guarantor of recognising ourselves as equal to others. According to Rousseau, consideration at social level is a foundation for our self-respect that is made through others' views. In this sense, "Sociability is not an accident or a contingency; it is the very definition of the human condition."（Todorov 2001, 13）

（5）Smith's idea of sympathy as authentic recognition

　Todorov points out that the subject appeared in Smith's "The Theory of Moral Sentiment" is imperfect because he/she demands sympathy by others. In this sense, Smith can be viewed as a disciple of Rousseau.（Todorov 2001, 16）As a comment to Smith's image of human, Todorov states, "We cannot make a judgement of ourselves without stepping outside of ourselves and seeing through the eyes of others. If a human being could be brought up in isolation, he would be unable to judge anything, not even himself, for the mirror to see himself would be lacking."（Todorov 2001, 17-18）In his theory of sympathy, Smith states that material wealth is not the ultimate goal of our life. On the contrary, interest, sympathy

or admiration by others is the very end of our life. The true reason behind of our desire of material wealth is to be found in the fact that the wealth is a common object of respect by others. Similarly, by avoiding poverty, we will no longer become an object of contempt of others. Smith takes the fact that human as a social being as a matter of course. In Smith's view, the essence of our socialisation is laid in the fact that we become the subject of sympathy to others whilst being conscious of ourselves as the object of others' sympathy. If we grow up outside society, we would lack of the chance of socialisation and awareness of being an object of other's eyes. (Haakonssen 1981, 52) Being in society is a necessary condition for our self consciousness. Smith writes,

> Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind. (Smith, TMS, III, 1, s3)

Also, another reason that Smith states that our need of sympathy cannot be dissolved into utility is found in the fact that we need relationship with others by nature. Todorov briefly summarises this point, "What I desire is the relationship itself-love, comfort, recognition- not something this relationship can get for me." (Todorov 2001, 55) As Todorov suggests, Smith's theory of sympathy can be read as an argument over the need of social recognition that is required by all of us who live in the modern society. Our life is a course of relationships of recognition with others. In the case where social relations with others is terminated, I will no longer be a live subject in society even if I may still live physically. In reality, marginalisation or loneliness that is caused by unrecognition or unconcerned can become a cause of suicide. At this point, sympathy has a crucial meaning since it is a form of recognition at the sentimental and therefore, authentic level.

（6）The mother-child relationship as the origin of recognition in our life history

The human being is a mammal and one mammalian common features is that mother needs to care of her baby.[4] For our survival, the mother-child relationship always takes crucial role. (De Waal 2010, Location.217-219) Here, in our own life history, there is another origin of the need of recognition by others. As well as social and phenomenological account of the need of recognition, the fact that we are raised by our family members, especially by our mother, explains our sense of the need of recognition. A Japanese Social Anthropologist Yoshinaru Fujioka (Fujioka 1974) explains that a new born baby is enabled to gain a

---

4) The famous experiment of American psychologist Harry Harlow (1958) of "wire mother" and "cloth mother" for infant monkey indicates the great importance of skin ship of mother and infant as a foundation of the growth of infant. In his famous experiment, Harlow separated the infant monkey from real mother and provided artificial two surrogates; one was made of wire with bottle of milk and the other was covered with textile but no food. The infant monkey went to the wire mother only when he was in hunger, but he was clinging to the cloth mother in the rest of time.

relationship with the object of this world through his/her clings to their mother and her response to it by embracing, cuddling or talking. Fujioka says that this is the reason why the mother-child relationship is fundamental in our life for making relationships with the objects and others. In Fujioka's account, we gain prototype of the image of the object during this state of embodiment with his/her mother.（Fujioka 1974, 59-69）

　　Todorov develops the theory of mother-child relationship as an origin of our need of recognition by introducing the term "gaze". According to Todorov, it is true that, as others say, nursing and caring of the baby is necessary for his/her survival, however, they are also needed for the mother to be recognised by the baby as his/her mother. Mother-child relationship of human being is different from other animals in that baby requires the "gaze" of the mother as proof of her recognition. There, mother-child relationship of recognition is formed between the mother and baby. This relationship through a gaze is a unique phenomenon to humans. Through the process of exchanging gazes and affirmation of value between the child and mother, child comes to gain the sense of "self" that is distinctive to others.（Todorov 2001, 23-24）In this way, we gain the sense of respect and identity in our early stage of life. Our need of recognition originates in our early mother-child relationship. However, later we expand our object of recognition to other social relations such as friends in school or colleagues in a company. However, our relationship of recognition with our close family members will be retained as the core of developed social relations in larger groups. This foundational significance of the mother-child relationship as the origin of our need of recognition indicates our special status of the need of recognition. Our need of recognition by others is derived from our mother-child relation in childhood as a radical need that is coupled with our need of survival. This need is foundational and universal throughout our life because of its origin. Because of this nature, even if we may pretend to be freed from need of recognition, it is impossible for us to overcome this radical and universal need that has been given as a destiny of human being.

（7）Separation of the legal/institutional and social spheres as a problem of recognition in a culturally diverse society.

　　A characteristic of Smith's theory of sympathy is to be found in its focus on our inner authentic sentiment. Even with legal status or welfare treatments, some people in society can be still viewed as aliens who are not fully accepted by the majority. Sympathy is examined by Smith as a fellow-feeling that relates people at an inner authentic level. In his theory, need of sentimental cement among citizens is regarded as a condition of society. Hegel's idea of recognition also discusses the nature of our recognition in our inner dimension as an intuition of us in others. The difference of the idea of Smith and Hegel seems to be laid in the difference of share of cognition or sentiment.

　　A significance of Taylor's theory of multiculturalism is laid in the reasoning of the claim of multiculturalism policy as a form of recognition. Nevertheless, its pitfall is to be found in the

fact that antagonism among ethnic groups in social spheres may undermine the possibility of sense of belonging in such a culturally diverse society. With self-satisfaction and lack of communication of the groups, recognition of cultural rights whilst acknowledging universal citizenship may leave a hostile or unconcerned view against different cultural groups in the same society in their daily life. The same concern is also true of society where multiculturalism policy or extra cultural rights are not taken. Some people may not be accepted as "true members" of society. The mechanism of unrecognition or misrecognition that Taylor examined as a cause of self-discrimination is also true of the lack of sympathy by others. Absence of sympathy by others in the situation of social marginalisation will bring sense of inferiority or misery in the subject. Also, we will feel anxiety in ourselves if we lack communication with others, because in that case, we will not have opportunity to be recognised by others. Such an anxious situation may become the ground for producing extremists such as racists or chauvinists. With regard to this point, Martha Nussbaum (2010) referred to recent studies of experimental psychology and states that man may create a scapegoat from which he/she takes distance as it appears to be his/her own anxiety such as disgust.

> Disgust, as psychological research emphasizes, is full of irrational magical thinking. It is no surprise that ideas of contamination are ubiquitous in racism and other types of group subordination. Projective disgust is always a suspect emotion, because it involves self-repudiation and the displacement of self-repudiation onto another group that is really just a set of bodily human beings like the ones doing the projecting, only more socially powerless. (Nussbaum 2010, 33)

In the situation where people lack of communication and absence of the sense of being a member of the same society, such a projection to some people and separation can easily occur. In this regard, the concept of sympathy is significant in approaching social problems since a lack of recognition at our authentic level in the social sphere may be a cause of various problems.

（8）Lack of concern and sympathy

In society where equal status as a majority is guaranteed for social minorities, people's lack of concern has to be noted as a problem. Because in some cases, we are unconcerned about others' circumstances, even if a membership or welfare service in society exists, various issues of social or economic problems of those unconcerned people will be overlooked as the issues to be resolved. Also, unconcern to others is a passive way to reject social existence of its objects and that will have a similar impact as misrecognition or unrecognition. Smith states that the very reason of the pride of a rich man and disgrace of a poor man is laid in the presence or absence of attention of others. Whilst distinguishing "overlooked" and "disapproved", Smith says that they both have the same humiliating effects to the object because of the fact that they both have the attitude of neglect.

The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him. At the thought of this, his heart seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder of his wealth, upon this account, than for all the other advantages it procures him. The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. He is mortified upon both accounts. for though to be overlooked, and to be disapproved of, are things entirely different, yet as obscurity covers us from the daylight of honour and approbation, to feel that we are taken no notice of, necessarily damps the most agreeable hope, and disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature.（Smith, TMS, I, iii, 2, s1）

In order to feel the sense of existence and legal status, a fellow-feeling is needed in society. Interest in the object is a necessary condition for his/her sympathy and where there is sympathy to the object, interests to the object always exists. Therefore, realising sympathy as a fellow-feeling in society functions to prevent lack of concern in society.

In comparison to the idea of recognition, sympathy can be viewed as an authentic form of recognition at its sentimental level. However, in a culturally diverse society, recognition of the status of cultural groups at its public legal level through providing single or differentiated citizenship still allows some room of hostility or carelessness against other minority/majority groups in day-to-day social life. According to Smith's theory of sympathy, we need sympathetic relations with others at the social level. The realisation of sympathetic relations among people will contribute to the sense of belonging in a culturally diverse society whether or not it embraces multiculturalism.

２．Tolerance and sympathy
（１）Definition of tolerance

Toleration is "the practice of tolerating something, in particular differences of opinion or behaviour"（OED 2005）and tolerance means by "the ability or willingness to tolerate the existence of opinions or behaviour that one dislike or disagrees with"（OED 2005）. In the argument of a multicultural society, the word toleration tends to be used to describe an attitude of allowing different thoughts or behaviours of others, and not forcing one's ideas on others. In the politics of toleration of a multicultural society, some ethnic or religious behaviour is not given equal status to those of dominant public culture and promotion, and reproducing those tolerated cultures are not allowed in public sphere. Principally, those tolerated cultural practices such as using different language, wearing costumes or practicing religious customs are allowed within the private sphere as long as they do not harm other's rights.

（2）The origin of tolerance as a passive virtue

The idea of toleration has originated in religious conflicts of the 15th and 16th centuries between Protestant and Catholics in Europe. In that religious war period, although tolerating different religious beliefs were viewed as unfaithful, tolerant attitudes towards other religions enabled the avoiding of lethal conflicts between religious groups, and toleration has come to be accepted as a passive virtue or necessary evil in society where different religious beliefs coexist. In the 17th century, John Locke justified the value of toleration in his "A letter concerning toleration"（1991）, published in 1685, by logic that religious beliefs are a matter of people's mind and therefore, they cannot be infringed upon by external political authority. Locke states,

> The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.（Locke 1991, 17）

Toleration was needed, because conflicts over legitimacy of beliefs would not disappear otherwise. Toleration in this sense seems to be still valid. Toleration has been required from the point of rationality for coexistence with others who hold a different sense of values or beliefs that contest with the subject's sense of values or beliefs.

（3）Tolerance and a culturally diverse society: Susan Mendus's theory of tolerance

Susan Mendus（1989）analyses complicated contemporary societies, including culturally diverse societies, from the perspective of toleration. According to Mendus, toleration is required in the environment where plural sense of values coexists and some of them are the objects of denial or disgust for the people there. In order for the concept of toleration to make sense, the subject of toleration（hereafter tolerator）has to be in the standing where the he/she/they influence the object of toleration（hereafter tolerated）. Mendus points out that intolerance（and tolerance）exists in the social sphere as well as in the legal sphere.

> Indeed, one of the most crushing forms of intolerance is social disapproval, whether or not backed by legal sanction. There are, therefore, two fronts on which intolerance may manifest itself: the legal front and the social front.（Mendus 1989, 4）

This means that even if in the legal sphere, tolerant legal norm exist, intolerant attitudes to some people may exist in the social sphere. If so, will the implementation of toleration in both legal and social spheres be the solution for plural society? Mendus's answer is "no". The reason is laid in the nature of the concept of toleration. In fact, the nature of this concept, displeasure of the tolerated to the tolerator is presupposed, and due to this, whether it is of legal or social sphere, an unfair relationship between dominant and dominated always appears in the relationship. In other words, although toleration in general is supposed as a social virtue, its practice is inevitably grounded on the unfair relationship between tolerator

and tolerated. Mendus calls this contradicted nature of this concepts as "paradox of toleration".

> The paradox is this: normally, we count toleration as a virtue in individuals and a duty in societies. However, where toleration is based on moral disapproval, it implies that the thing tolerated in wrong and ought not to exist. The question which then arises is why, given the claim to objectivity incorporated in the strong sense of toleration, it should be thought good to tolerate.（Mendus 1989, 19）

With a comparative analysis of the idea of toleration of J.S. Mill and John Locke, Mendus defends Locke's idea of toleration that is based on rationality of the presence of toleration and rejects Mill's idea of toleration that actively fosters a different sense of values in society. However, according to Mendus, even if toleration in Locke's sense is realised in society, sense of belonging to society will not be accompanied because of the abovementioned nature of the concept. Understanding rights of citizens who hold equal citizenship with toleration results in treating those tolerated as secondly citizens who are viewed as the negative object for the tolerator, even if that distinction is useful in improving the welfare of those people as a result of active intervention policies. If the culture or existence of a minority people is understood as an object of toleration, it rather means that they are recognised as negative or unwelcome members of the culturally diverse society. If so, those who are labelled as "tolerated" should not feel happy and, therefore, their sense of belonging to society will not be attained. According to Mendus, since the state "must be more than the supermarket of individual choice"（Mendus 1989, 155）, sense of belonging to the whole society is still required.

（4）Tolerance and sympathy

In regard to requirement of sense of belonging in a culturally diverse society, Adam Smith's idea of sympathy seems to have advantages compared to toleration. First of all, according to the nature of the concept, sympathy connects its subject and object at their authentic sentimental level. At the same time, the object of sympathy does not need to be located as a morally negative being and an unfair power or moral relationship is not required between the parties. The object of sympathy is connected to the subject as a sentimentally sharable being through mutual understanding. In practice, sympathetic relations through mutual understandings are possible by acquiring knowledge of the object and by practice of communications. Second, sympathy to others is sought for its intrinsic value whereas toleration is required for the sake of coexistence of different kinds of people. Smith says that sympathy by others is a universal need for human existence. There, the claim of sympathy in the human relations of society is stronger than the demand of toleration, which is ultimately based on the idea of calculation of cost and benefit. Furthermore, although the attitude of toleration is to be distinguished from an unconcerned or careless attitude, as long as the relationship between toleration stands, the care of tolerator enables to enhance negative ravel of its object. If such an unfair moral and power relation appears between parties, as a rational behaviour they may prefer to distance themselves from each other to

avoid mutually unpleasant circumstances. In other words, in the relation of tolerator and tolerated, rather unconcerned or careless attitudes may be rationally chosen. Because of the nature of this idea, the relation of toleration may separate the relation of parties, however, in sympathetic relations, care of the object is necessarily coupled with this sympathetic attitude. For the sake of realising sense of belonging to the whole society, sympathy with others seems to be preferable principle to be adopted in a culturally diverse society. In the case where toleration of a culture or people in society is promoted as a social virtue, those tolerated will rather desperate with such a society where they are always ravelled as such. In order to realise sense of belonging to the whole society by the members of different groups of people, recognition of other members as equal citizens at an authentic level is needed. Sympathy as a fellow-feeling is a preferable idea to be promoted to realise harmonious and equal relationships among citizens who hold different cultural backgrounds.

（5）The necessity and possibility of the coexistence of tolerance and sympathy

  With difficulties of the nature of the concept, toleration may be hard to become a social virtue in contemporary culturally diverse society. However, it does not necessarily mean that the idea of toleration is to be denied in our society. There is always a room for toleration in a plural or culturally diverse society because with the reality of the contemporary society, there are various senses of values, orientations, beliefs or cultural practices that coexist. We do not always agree or accept all of those differences and therefore, there is always room of tolerating differences that are not fit for the subject. Here, Michael Walzer's（1997）statement sounds plausible as he argued that toleration enables differences and differences require tolerance. According to Walzer, toleration in a plural society is neither a universal principle nor virtue of the behaviours of individuals. Rather, toleration is a requirement for practices for moderating a plural society that holds diversity in many respects.

> And in any pluralist society there will always be people, however well entrenched their own commitment to pluralism, for whom some particular difference- perhaps a form of worship, family arrangement, dietary rule, sexual practice, or dress code-is very hard to live with. Though they support the idea of difference, they tolerate the instantiated differences. But even people who don't experience this difficulty are properly called tolerant: they make room for men and women whose beliefs they don't adopt, whose practices they decline to imitate.（Walzer 1997, 11）

  This Walzer's opinion seems to be a passive reasoning of toleration in a plural society. Alternatively, there is another rather active reasoning of toleration, saying that the diversity of society is beneficial for the members of society in the long run, because such a variety will contribute to cultivation and enhancement of the liberal environment of society. For instance, a Japanese political theorist Tatsuo Inoue（1999）says,

> The core of liberal society is not laid in simple reciprocal recognition of 'difference'. Rather, the core is laid in cultivation of magnanimity that acknowledges 'difference

of the difference', say, diversity of dimensions of confrontations where people are differentiated and accepting it as a constant condition of our life. It cannot be hoped for the spirit that cannot bear this discipline of 'double magnanimity' to hold the liberty.（Inoue 1999, 114, translated by author of this paper）

Also, from a life historical point of view, the need of toleration can be explained by the fact that we have a desire to repel against paternalistic attitudes of our close family relations despite that at the same time we desire recognition from them. In society, there is some deviate odd and offensive behaviour that intends to draw attention from others. Because of this, there has to be some room for those different or differentiated behaviours as they may contribute to richness of the culture of society even if they may not be preferred or affirmed by majority of people. Nevertheless, in light of recognition, the idea of incommensurability of senses of values or impossibility of understanding of others should not be grounds to justify toleration. If we fall into the view that a different sense of values is incomprehensible, the possibility of sympathy based on mutual understanding is lost. The essence of Smith's theory of sympathy is *recognition at the sentimental level* and that need is derived from our own universal life history and our nature as social beings. Our need of recognition by others is fundamental and universal. Here, there is reason that toleration should not be required unconditionally simply with the view of incommensurability of sense of values or impossibility of understanding different others.

Due to the nature of the concept, toleration is considered to be a passive virtue required for the necessity of cohabiting with different others in the same society. However, sympathy is a rather intrinsically valuable element that is to be sought actively as cement in the plural society. Nevertheless, the fact is that it is impossible to realise exactly the same sense of values or understanding among people in society, Therefore, as well as the need and possibility of sympathy, some room for tolerating differences needs to also remain. Consequently, in reality, sympathy has to be pursued in society whilst some room of tolerance remains. In regard to the problems with the concept of toleration, one hypothetical solution might be to open different senses of values to be understandable and acceptable to the subject instead of fixing them as mere objects of toleration. Even with discordance in the sense of value of the object and subject, a potential for further mutual understanding is to remain in many subjects and there, the possibility of mutual sympathy is also opened. Sympathetic relations of diverse people are to be aimed at because of its universality. Unconcerned views or unconditional denial against some objects is to be avoided as the reasoning for the necessity of toleration.

Even so, some assert that toleration is needed because of our natural incapability of understanding others. For instance, a Japanese sociologist Naoki Sudo（2001）states in his work "Incomprehensible other and misunderstood self: A social theory of toleration" that under the trend of globalisation, chances of confluence with incomprehensible people have been increasing and because of swift change of social trends, even those who were supposed

to share a common sense of values such as family members or members of the same community, have come to be incomprehensible. According to Sudo, the only alternative in such a situation is discarding possibility of understanding them.（Sudo 2001, 234-235）Sudo suggests to accept the reality of incomprehensiveness of others and build a new social order based on this fact.

> Therefore, such a strategy as limiting relation with others and forming and maintaining social order by understanding others is becoming null and void. Therefore, we need to accept 'incomprehensible others and incomprehensible ourselves' and based on this premise, we need to build new social order on the ground of trust.（Sudo 2001, 162-163, translated by author of this paper）

Sudo's logic is that we at first need to accept the reality that we are not capable of understanding each other and because of this, a tolerant social system that allows ample room for different senses of values is to be preferred, in order to live with incomprehensive others whilst discarding possibility of mutual understandings. However, I do not agree with such an extreme view. It is true that we may not be able to say we understand the object perfectly. Even with the possibility of "understanding" the contents of a book, it is difficult to say that I understand it completely. Also, as well as understanding the level of of its contents, even the appearance of the book may not be perfectly shared by all of us as it depends on individual eyesight. Nevertheless, even with those differences of perception or understanding, it is also difficult for us to perceive that we do not share our perception or understanding of the object at all. In regard to understanding others, for our fellow-feeling of society, we do not need to suppose or require perfect mutual understanding between parties. For example, I have never spoken to the student who sits down in front of me at this EUI's library and I do not know his tastes, hobbies or religious beliefs. However, in case he faints suddenly, undoubtedly, I will try to help him out by alerting the staff of this library. Or, if a book accidentally falls down on his head from a bookshelf behind him, even without knowing his profile, I will sympathize with him by asking, "Are you OK?" I want to illustrate here that even though all of us are identical but unique beings in life history, beliefs and cultural backgrounds, we also share some things in common across those varieties. In light of my own life experiences, I should be able to share pain, suffering or happiness with others to some extent by knowing his/her/their circumstances. If the possibility of understanding others is open to us through provision of information and communications, it will also mean that our possibility of sharing sentiment with those is also opened along with it.

Under the multiethnic empire state such as past Osman Turkey, the government was ordering the state without interfering with the customs of each cultural group. However, even the most of contemporary nation states that adapt a liberal democratic regime, "a single dominant group organizes the common life in a way that reflects its own history and culture"（Walzer 1997, 25）and in order to maintain culture of the dominant group, "the character of public education, the symbols and ceremonies of public life, the state calendar and the

holidays"（Walzer 1997, 25）are determined. There are flexible and comprehensive attitudes towards religious or cultural minorities in society, and in most cases, the right of self-government or judicial power is not approved for them, especially those immigrants who enter a different nation state are treated as the object of toleration whose customs or cultures are not the object of public support for their preservation or reproduction. In this sense, those people are the object of toleration at an official or legal level. Even so, in daily social sphere, it is possible to have sympathetic relationships with those legally tolerated people through communications and mutual understandings even with differentiated cultural status in society. Legal framework may not always be required for the realisation of sympathetic relations between parties. Even without such an official framework, it is possible for us to sympathise with other objects through understanding and communication. Nevertheless, it must be another truth that the official statuses for being fellow citizen function as a cognitive framework within which people sympathise with each other. In this sense, even if totally equal status as a majority is not given to some cultural minorities, some legal status such as denizen-ship or other sort of citizenship that backs residency and membership of society must be significant in a culturally diverse society, whereas such an entitlement does not guarantee fellow-feeling among citizens.

３．Sympathy, economic equality and liberty
（1）Sympathy and economic equality

What are the relations between sympathy and economic equality or sympathy and liberty? Even with equal civil status, an economic gap will hinder realisation of fellow-feeling in a society. The core problem of being in poverty is laid in their self understanding that they are marginalised members of society. Also, a lack of fellow-feeling by others results in low self-esteem of those marginalised because of the internalisation of their marginalised status. In this respect, a lack of sympathy by others will function as a disadvantage in self formation of individuals in society. Smith argued that poor man is miserable because of his own awareness of being marginalised from fellow-feeling by others（Smith, TMS, I, iii, 2）. In the same way, even if a negative view of cultural minorities is attempted to be revised at a political or social level, as long as their living conditions are poorer than majority of society, such a revision will end up as a superficial politically corrected view that is floating from the reality and authentic self understanding of those minorities. As well as Smith, William Bonger（1969）says, "Poverty kills the social sentiments in man, destroys in fact all relations between men. He who is abandoned by all can no longer have any feeling for those who have left him to his fate."（Bonger 1969, 53）Because of this, public assistance is needed for improving economic conditions of those minorities.

In "Politics and Passion"（2004）, Walzer argues that in contemporary culturally diverse situations, an emancipation model that allocates equally divided power to social minority groups as an individual based liberalism policy has been implemented, however, in reality, such a political emancipation does not raise the economic status of those minorities and therefore, a policy based on "a material version of multicultural politics- 'meat-and-potatoes

multiculturalism'" (Walzer 2004, xiii) is needed. But, as Walzer states in "Sphere of Justice" (1983), redistribution of the goods in society as a policy of dissolving social and economic inequality does not guarantee self-respect of the citizens of society, it contributes to "conditions" of their self-respect. (Walzer 1983, 272-280) Even if welfare measures are taken, negative prejudice of ethnic minorities of society will not immediately be dissolved. In the case where welfare support is provided, an unfavourable stigma as a permanent beneficiary may remain as a result of the unfair provider and recipient relationship. In fact, in those countries that accept immigrants, a discontented view with regard to welfare policy and those immigrants with respect to integration education or life support has been manifested and it has been one of the excuses of rejecting or expelling immigrants. As Knud Haakonssen (1981) states, in Smith's view, sympathy stands on reciprocal relationship between parties.

> I have already indicated more than once that sympathy for Smith is something mutual between men. This feature of sympathy is, I suggest, crucial for Smith's whole moral theory and, indeed, his idea of sympathy is in itself hardly intelligible without it. (Haakonssen 1981, 52)

In the long term perspective, a reciprocal relationship must furnish solid ground for the mutual sentimental tie between majority and minorities, even if welfare assistance is needed as a transitional measure.

（2）Sympathy and liberty

Smith's theory of sympathy is based on his observation of sympathetic behaviours of society, and in this sense his theory is a description of the reality of our behaviours. At the same time, it also indicates sympathetic behaviour as a normative style of our social life. In other words, Smith says that sympathy is necessary as a condition of our society. However, it is possible that some people may say that a requirement of a certain amount of sentiment is dangerous for liberal society as it may oppress our freedom.

As a response to this doubt, let me think about the sentimental level of the sympathy. In "On Revolution" (1990), Hanna Arendt points out that the driving force of the French revolution was the people's compassion to social poverty and that social sentimentalism was the cause of direction of plurality into the unity of society where violence and intolerance dominated.

> The direction of the French Revolution was deflected almost from its beginning from this course of foundation through the immediacy of suffering; it was determined by the exigencies of liberation not from tyranny but from necessity, and it was actuated by the limitless immensity of both the people's misery and the pity this misery inspired. The lawlessness of the 'all is permitted' sprang here still from the sentiments of the heart whose very boundlessness helped in the unleashing of a stream of boundless violence. (Arendt 1990, 92)

　As Arendt argued, socially shared strong compassion towards misery, such as poverty, of citizens may result in intolerance of those who do not share similar views with others. Even so, in my view, realisation of fellow-feeling at a rather weaker level contributes to the resolution of social problems such as social marginalisation of some members of society caused by the lack of social cement, and will function to realise freedom and equality of the members of society. According to Smith, even though sympathy is a universal need of humans, man cannot hold the same degree of sentiment of the object. Yet, according to Smith, shared sentiment at a weaker degree is "sufficient for the harmony of society". （Smith, TMS, I, i, 4, s7, Haakonssen 1981, 50）In this Smith's account, strong compassion towards some object is not supposed as a condition of social unity. It is understandable that coercing some particular view and high degree of passion is not the best route for a plural society. In light of the need of the social sentiment, such a situation where citizens are totally freed from concern to welfare of other member or group has to be avoided because, once again, unconcerned attitudes towards others will allow marginalisation of some people and will eventually undermine the unity of society as a ground of liberty of people.[5)]

　Moreover, a separate opinion may say that enforcement of a particular view of others as the same fellow citizens is an attempt of infringing private sphere of individuals and, therefore, against the principle of liberty. In fact, Leo Strauss expressed such a view in his work "Spinoza's Critique of Religion"（1997）. Strauss approves that equality in the public or legal sphere or that the endowment of citizenship is not a sufficient condition to dissolve practice of discriminations in social sphere. In the Weimar Republic that was founded in 1919 in Germany, a liberal democratic regime was realised and equal citizenship was given to Jews as a social minority. However, Strauss was pessimistic about the possibility of dissolving discrimination against Jews in that liberal democratic regime because of the fact that the private sphere should be different from public sphere. Political power was not allowed to interfere with private sphere due to the principle of protection of the private sphere. In such a regime, according to Strauss, discrimination would not be dissolved by prohibiting discrimination in the public sphere. In Strauss's view, in order to dissolve the Jewish discrimination problem, all sorts of discriminations even in the private sphere would have to be banned, but if that were the case, the liberal state will be destroyed. （Strauss 1997）When we take a look at the need for sympathy, even if such a law that commands straightforwardly, "You must sympathise with your neighbour", it will not be effective in realising sympathy in society. Even if we are forced by the power to believe something, we will always retain the freedom of thought in our mind. Nevertheless, at the same time, we need recognition of our existence by others in society through understanding, whilst freedom of behaviour and thought is to be retained as the core of autonomy. Being unrecognised or

---

5) It should not be preferable to have too rigorous control policy against xenophobic or racist behaviour in society as it ruins liberty of society. However, as the "Broken windows theory" tells, unconcerned attitude and no interference policy may eventually call for more aggressive attitudes of those who perceive no interference as a "go sign" of their behaviour.

unaccepted in society is another form of an illiberal situation of individuals and this is the very reason why the sentimental cement is needed. This sentimental need is not equivalent to the need of legal rights. Also, endorsement of law does not dissolve the need of recognition. As Michael Ignatieff argued this point in his "Need of strangers" (1984), even if need of right is satisfied, human dignity can be infringed upon.

> The pathos of need, like the pathos of all purely verbal claims to the justice or mercy of another, is that need is powerless to enforce its right. (Ignatieff 1984, 27)

If so, can the need of sympathy in society be realised without direct enforcement of legal order or rights within the liberalism? My response to this question may not be the ultimate or decisive; however, I would say that creating condition of sympathy with others is possible as a solution to realise it. Social marginalisation through lack of sympathy will have a negative impact on the condition of autonomy of people as well as the lack of social recognition. For the autonomy of the people in society, the environment where identity and self respect are nourished equally is needed. Josef Raz (1994) summarises this point briefly as follows,

> An autonomy-sustaining common culture is a presupposition of the freedom of one and all. People concerned with their own autonomy must be concerned with the flourishing of the common culture. They must be concerned with the existence of one major condition for the autonomy of all. (Raz 1994, 107)

In a contemporary culturally diverse society, this is also true of the relationship between people of different cultural backgrounds or their descriptions. If some members of society are described with negative images or prejudices, that would not be fair in light of the principle of equality of society. It is true that we are capable of overcoming past non-preferable conditions and are able to direct ourselves to envisaged goals. Even so, those who are left as the secondary citizens require extra effort to overcome their lower conditions whilst others do not need to make such an effort? It probably means unequal conditions of the citizens in the same society.

Preparing an equal environment for formation of the autonomous self in society means preparing conditions for realising fellow-feeling among people in society. A requirement of sympathy is not a right, but a need. However, within liberalism, it can be realised through an indirect approach. The character of sympathy as a fellow-feeling is not a strong passion that damages our freedom, and that is to be realised as a weak sentiment that functions as a cement for the unity of society.

References

Books

Arendt, Hannah.（1990）On Revolution, New York: Penguin Books.

Bonger, Willem Adrian.（1969）Criminality and Economic Conditions, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Connolly, William E.（2002）Identity/difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

De Waal, Frans.（2010）The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society, Souvenir Press:［Kindle edition］Amazon Digital Services, Inc.

Elster, Jon.（1989）Nuts and bolts for the social sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fujioka, Yoshinaru.（1974）Image and human being, Tokyo: Nippon Housou Kyokai Syuppan.
［藤岡喜愛.（1974）イメージと人間―精神人類学の視野, 東京: 日本放送出版会.］

Haakonssen, Knud.（1981）The science of a legislator: the natural jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hanazaki, Kouhei.（1981）Philosophy of living place: departure from sympathy, Tokyo: Iwanami-syoten.
［花崎皋平.（1981）生きる場の哲学――共感からの出発. 東京: 岩波書店.］

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich.（1967）Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox. Edition, London: Oxford University Press.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich.（1977）Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich.（1986）The Jena System, 1804-05: Logic and Metaphysics, McGill: McGill-Queens University Press.

Hume, David.（1998）An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hume, David.（2000）A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ignatieff, Michael.（1984）The Needs of Strangers, London: Chatto & Windus.

Ignatieff, Michael.（1999）The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, New York: Vintage.

Inoue, Tatsuo.（1999）Freedom to Others: Liberalism as a Philosophy of Publicness, Tokyo: Soubun-sya.
［井上達夫.（1999）他者への自由―公共性の哲学としてのリベラリズム． 東京：創文社.］

Ishikawa, Shinsaku et al.eds,（2012）Societies of the EU illuminated from peripheries, Tokyo: Sekai-shisou-sya.
［石川真作（他編）.（2012）周縁から照射するＥＵ社会―移民・マイノリティとシティズンシップの人類学. 東京: 世界思想社.］

Kojeve, Alexandre.（1980）Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the "Phenomenology of Spirit", Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press.

Kymlicka, Will.（1995）Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, New York: Clarendon Press.

Lang, Gladys.E, Lang, Kurt.（1970）.Politics and Television, Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Locke, John.（1991）A letter concerning toleration, John Horton and Susan Mendus eds, London: Routledge.

Mendus, Susan.（1989）Toleration and The Limits of Liberalism, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Morrow, Glenn.（1969）The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith: A Study in the Social Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century, Cranbury, NJ:　Scholar's Bookshelf.

Morooka, Yasuko.（2013）What is hate speech?, Tokyo: Iwanami-syoten.
［師岡康子.（2013）ヘイト・スピーチとは何か, 東京: 岩波書店.］

Mouffe, Chantal.（1996）The Return of The Political, New York: Verso Books.

Nakajima, Yoichi.（2006）Thought history of empathy, Tokyo: Soufu-sya.
［仲島陽一.（2006）共感の思想史, 東京: 創風社.］

Nussbaum, Martha Craven.（1996）For Love of Country: Debating The Limits of Patriotism, ed. Joshua Cohen, Boston: Beacon Press.

Nussbaum, Martha Craven.（2010）Not for profit: why democracy needs the humanities, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Polanyi, Michael.（1959）Study of Man, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Polanyi, Michael.（1967）Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge.

Raz, Joseph.（1994）Ethics in the public domain: essays in the morality of law and politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Scheler, Max.（1992）.Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David R. Lachterman, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Schmitt, Carl.（2007）The concept of the political, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Smith, Adam.（1976）The Theory of Moral Sentiments, eds. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Smith, Adam.（1993）An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Kathryn Sutherland. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strauss, Leo.（1997）, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sudo, Naoki.（2001）Incomprehensive Others and Incomprehensive Self, Tokyo: Keiso-syobou.

［数土直紀.（2001）理解できない他者と理解されない自己―寛容の社会理論, 東京: 勁草書房.］

Taylor, Charles et al.（1994）Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Tocqueville, Alexis de.（2007）Democracy in America: ed. Kramnick, Isaac, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Todorov, Tzvetan.（2001）Life in Common: An Essay in General Anthropology（European Horizons）, trans. Lucy Golsan, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Todorov, Tzvetan.（2013）L'Homme depayse: ［Kindle Format］Amazon Media EU S.a r.l.

Walzer, Michael.（1983）Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York: Basic Books.

Walzer, Michael.（1997）On Toleration, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Walzer, Michael.（2004）Politics and Passion: toward a more egalitarian liberalism, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wispe, Lauren.（2010）The Psychology of Sympathy, New York: Springer Publishing.

Papers

Jahoda G.（2005）Theodor Lipps and the shift from "sympathy" to "empathy", J Hist Behav Sci. 2005 Spring;41（2）:151-63.

Nomura, Mari.（2009）Jews and Latvians in Riga in 1941: On Latvians' cooperation to holocaust, Kanazawa University Economic Review, 30（1）.

［野村真理.（2009）1941年リーガのユダヤ人とラトヴィア人：ラトヴィア人のホロコースト協力をめぐって, 金沢大学経済論集, 金沢大学人間社会研究域経済学経営学系.］（http://hdl.handle.net/2297/27725）

Internet resources

Hamamatsu City.（2013）"Hamamatsu Intercultural City Vision 2013",（http://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/kokusai/kokusai/documents/iccvision_jp.pdf）

Hamamatsu International Communications and Exchange（http://www.hi-hice.jp/j_population.php）

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination（http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/jinshu/conv.html ）

Kawasaki City, "The guideline of permission of the use of 'public facilities":（http://www.city.kawasaki.jp/templates/press/cmsfiles/contents/0000092/92460/gaidorainn.pdf）

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan（http://www.soumu.go.jp/kokusai/index.html）

Ministry of Justice, "Enlightenment activities focusing on hate speech":（http://www.moj.go.jp/JINKEN/jinken04_00108.html）

Osaka City, "Outline of Osaka City Ordinance on Dealing with Hate Speech"（http://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/shimin/cmsfiles/contents/0000339/339043/29.8.17gaiyousyuusei.pdf

Statistics bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan（http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jinsui/ ）

The Ainu association of Hokkaido（http://www.ainu-assn.or.jp/about03.html ）

The Council of Local Authorities for International Relations（http://www.clair.or.jp/j/multiculture/kokusai/page-8.html）

United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.（2013）General recommendation No. 35:Combating racist hate speech.（http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/CERD_C_GC_35_7084_E.doc ）

U.S. Department of State.（2014）Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2013 Human Rights Reports: Japan（http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/eap/220199.htm）

Newspapers

"Abe criticizes increase in hate speech in Japan" Asahi-Shinbun. 8 May, 2013.（http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201305080042）

"General Recommendation No. 35- Combating racist hate speech" OHCHR（http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fGC%2f35&Lang=en）

"Hate related demonstration reduced to 35 -After 1 year of enactment of Hate Speech Act 2016, speech was "devised" in order to avoid recognition as a hate speech." Nikkei-Shinbun. 22 May, 2017（https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDG22H1X_S7A520C1000000/）

"Hundreds rally against hate speech in Osaka" Asahi-Shinbun. 15 July, 2013.（http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201307150018）

Jiji Press, May 23, 2013（http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201305/2013052200260&g=pol）

"Justice minister criticizes hate speech in Japan but won't punish offenders" Asahi-Shinbun. 10 May, 2013.（http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201305100069）

"Kyoto court bans 'hate speech' around school for ethnic Koreans" Asahi-Shinbun. 7 October, 2013.（http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201310070090）