{"created":"2023-05-15T12:05:44.541648+00:00","id":10443,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"98eede9c-8373-4d6f-9a33-a5e5f5866b79"},"_deposit":{"created_by":3,"id":"10443","owners":[3],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"10443"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:iwate-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00010443","sets":["1523:1524"]},"author_link":["64541","64540"],"item_28_alternative_title_23":{"attribute_name":"その他のタイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_alternative_title":"A STUDY ON MORAL THEORY AS INTERNAL REALISM AND THE REALITY OF FREEDOM"}]},"item_28_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2000-03-01","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographic_titles":[{}]}]},"item_28_date_6":{"attribute_name":"登録日","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_date_issued_datetime":"2011-09-29"}]},"item_28_description_11":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"科学研究費補助金[基盤研究C](課題番号10610030)研究成果報告書","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_28_description_12":{"attribute_name":"Abstract","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"近代の主観主義の流れのなかで、道徳に限らず実在論を素朴に主張することは難しい。理性の限界や文化の相対性が明らかになり、人間の本質や目的が神の視点ではなく等身大の視点から語られ始めたことが、近代の特質であるとすれば、一般に脱実在論の傾向は、当然の流れとも言えよう。事情は道徳理論の場合でも同じである。「よさ」の追求は個人の自由な選択に委ね、道徳理論の関心は、有限な理性や利己的欲望を前提に、「よさ」を追求する行為を統制する社会規則や富の配分原則(正義の原則)に注がれてきた。\n\nしかしそれらの理論がもたらしたものは、様々な立場の解消不可能な対立と、具体的場面での道徳的認知に対する無力さという問題であった。この問題に答えるために古代中世の共同体と徳の倫理の復活を唱えるものもいたが、現代にそれを単純に復活することは難しい。そこで本研究では、徳倫理の主張を参考にしながらも、近代の状況にそくした新たな実在論の可能性を検討した。価値の多元性を考慮するとき、単純に形而上学的な実在論を復権することは難しい。そこで私は、H・パットナムの内的実在論とその源流に位置するカントの超越論的観念論を、道徳に適用してみることにした。以下、本研究で明らかになったことを箇条書きする。\n\n1.内的実在論をとることで、多様な価値の実在性の場が確保できるが、現代において特に重要なのは、自由という価値にリアリティを与えることである。\n\n2.自由にリアリティを与えるとは、形式的自由や孤立を越えて、互いに他者の自立を可能にする自由を実質的な形で保障することである。\n\n3.実質的自由の保障には、センの潜在能力アプローチの分析が参考になるが、他方で具体的場面で実質的自由の認知力の育成には責任論などの別のアプローチが必要である。\n\n4.「なぜ道徳的であるべきか」という問題を検討する上で、内的実在論は有効に機能する可能性がある。","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"In the modern tendency toward subjectivism, it is difficult to maintain the naive moral realism. It was a specific character of the modern period that people became aware of the limitation of reason and of the relativity of culture, and also that people began to talk about the human nature and human purpose not from a God's point of view but from a life-sized viewpoint. In these situation, the purpose what one should pursuit depended on only the interests of individuals, not on what moral theory requires, whereas modern moral theory was concerned only with the rules for social behavior and the principles for distribution. But the principles which modern ethics have deduced, brought about many aspects of interminable disagreements on practical moral issues. Furthermore they proved scarcely any effectiveness on cognitive or conductive response required on any practical situation. For that reason, virtue ethics and moral realism, which estimate custom and reality of value, have lately attracted our concern. Restoration of virtue ethics and moral realism, however, might cause the uncritical conservatism or the privileged expert ethics. So the possibility of another type of moral realism, which could conform to the modern multiple values, is our concern and it was found that the Putnam's internal realism and Kant's empirical realism as transcendental idealism would make for it. And upon the internal realism, we argued as follows ;\n\n1. By adopting the internal realism, we could approve the reality of multiple values, but in the modern ethical situation, the most important issue is how we can let freedom have reality.\n\n2. To let freedom have realty means that we ought to assure the freedom substantially which make possible each one to stand one's own feet.\n\n3. A.Sen's capability approach would be useful for the assurance of substantial freedom, But to bring up the cognitive ability on freedom, it is necessary to approach from another perspectives (ex. responsibility).","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_28_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{}],"names":[{"name":"USAMI, Kosei"}]}]},"item_28_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者(機関)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"岩手大学教育学部"}]},"item_28_version_type_27":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa","subitem_version_type":"AM"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"宇佐美, 公生"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-11-14"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"kaken10610030.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"2.0 MB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"kaken10610030.pdf","url":"https://iwate-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10443/files/kaken10610030.pdf"},"version_id":"060e8785-b3c7-48ae-8952-754a57dae84f"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"A・セン","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Freedom","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"H.Putnam","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"H.パットナム","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Internal Realism","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Kant","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Liberalism","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Modern ethics","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Substantial freedom","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Transcendental idealism","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"カント","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"価値判断","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"価値実在論","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"公民教育","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"内的実在論","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"徳","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"潜在能力アプローチ","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"目的自体","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"自由","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"責任","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"超越論的観念論","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"道徳的実在論","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"research report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18ws"}]},"item_title":"内的実在論としての道徳理論と自由のリアリティーに関する研究","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"内的実在論としての道徳理論と自由のリアリティーに関する研究"}]},"item_type_id":"28","owner":"3","path":["1524"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2011-09-29"},"publish_date":"2011-09-29","publish_status":"0","recid":"10443","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["内的実在論としての道徳理論と自由のリアリティーに関する研究"],"weko_creator_id":"3","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-05-16T11:34:33.833320+00:00"}