| Item type |
学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) |
| 公開日 |
2022-08-30 |
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
Rent distribution in an ex-vessel auction market of fisheries |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Ex-vessel market |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Auction |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Fisheries management |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Information rent |
| キーワード |
|
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Structural estimation |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
|
資源タイプ |
journal article |
| 著者 |
ABE, Keita
MATSUKI, Yusuke
ISHIMURA, Gakushi
MANAGI, Shunsuke
|
| 著者(機関) |
|
|
値 |
Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics |
| 著者(機関) |
|
|
値 |
Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University |
| 著者(機関) |
|
|
値 |
Faculty of Agriculture, Iwate University |
| 著者(機関) |
|
|
値 |
Urban Institute, Graduate School of Engineering |
| 登録日 |
|
|
日付 |
2022-08-30 |
| 書誌情報 |
Marine Policy
巻 133,
p. 104771,
発行日 2021-09-09
|
| ISSN |
|
|
収録物識別子タイプ |
ISSN |
|
収録物識別子 |
0308597X |
| 抄録 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
|
内容記述 |
While the rent generation for harvesters in common property resource exploitation has been well studied, questions about the rent distribution between the resource users and the downstream sector remain. We study the effects of information asymmetry on the distribution of rent between harvesters and buyers in the ex-vessel fish market and discuss the implication on the outcomes of natural resource management. Under a first-price sealed-bid auction of the fish-by-fish firsthand market in Japan, the markdown gained by buyers is estimated using a structural auction model with a nonparametric method. The results suggest that auction winners enjoy considerably high markdown (48% on average) from market transactions in fish. In a market in which asymmetric information drives down the price, the markdown can work as a resource management tax and disincentivize harvesters from overfishing and overinvesting. This “unintended tax” should be recognized in the design of public policy because a policy that changes the equilibrium may affect the trade-off between marginalized low-income harvesters and the abundant resource stock. |
| 抄録（URL） |
|
|
表示名 |
Rent distribution in an ex-vessel auction market of fisheries |
|
URL |
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X21003821 |
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
Elsevier Ltd. |
| 権利 |
|
|
権利情報 |
© 2021 The Author(s). |
| 権利URI |
|
|
権利情報 |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| DOI |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isIdenticalTo |
|
|
識別子タイプ |
DOI |
|
|
関連識別子 |
info:doi/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104771 |
| 著者版フラグ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
VoR |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
mp-v133p104771 (691.9 kB)
